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DETERMINANTS OF BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN 
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ABSTRACT 
The study provides new evidence on the determinants of banking sector development, 
using data from 18 emerging economies during 2000-2009. The study employs panel 
data analysis, namely Random Effect, Feasible Generalized Least Squares and 
Dynamic Generalized Method of Moments estimations. The empirical results 
demonstrate that rule of law; economic growth and workers’ remittances promote 
banking sector development. However, financial liberalization and liberal trade 
policies have an insignificant influence on banking sector development. Therefore, the 
study suggests that emerging countries, aiming at enhancing banking sector 
development, should establish strong institutional infrastructure; whereas financial 
liberalization and trade openness should come at a later stage.  Finally, the study 
provides evidence on a complementary relationship between banking sectors and 
capital markets in emerging countries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Well-functioning financial systems lead to efficient capital allocation, risk 
diversification, reduction of transaction costs and information asymmetry thereby 
stimulating growth in the long run and improving the overall economic productivity 
(Fry, 1995; Buera, Kaboski, & Shin, 2009). Moreover strong domestic financial 
systems offer a stable source of finance instead of volatile external capital flows (Zoli, 
2007; Kpodar & Gbenyo, 2010). Guillaumont Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) show 
that the poor can benefit from the development of financial systems through the 
reduction of transaction cost and the provision of saving opportunities through the 
McKinnon 'conduit effect'
1
. 
Therefore, financial development became a policy priority for governments. 
Nevertheless, some countries succeeded in achieving deeper financial systems while 
others remained financially underdeveloped (Law & Habibullah, 2009). Thus, the 
question of what determines financial development became increasingly important.  
The financial system comprises mainly of the banking sector, the capital 
market, the insurance sector and the mortgage finance sector. The literature suggests 
that most emerging countries depend on the banking sector as the main pillar of the 
financial system (Levine & Zervos, 1998; Levine, 2002); therefore the study focuses 
on the development of the banking sector. 
To assess banking sector development, various measures were used in the 
literature. Some of these measures are sized-based such as: the ratios of money and 
quasi money (M2)
2
 and liquid liabilities
3
, also known as financial depth measure 
                                                      
1
The conduit effect assumes that even if financial institutions do not provide finance to the poor, they 
will benefit the poor through profitable financial opportunities for savings.  
2
It comprises the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central 
government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the 
central government. 
3
Liquid liabilities are also known as broad money (M3). They are the sum of currency and deposits in 
the central bank (M0), plus transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings 
deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase 
"He can only become an 
entrepreneur by 
previously becoming a 
debtor" Schumpeter 
(1912, p.102)  
2 
 
(Levine, Loayza, & Beck, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2001; W. Huang, 2006). 
However a major problem of size-based measures is that the size of the banking sector 
does not necessarily measure its capacity to perform its functions as a financial 
intermediary (Levine, et al., 2000). In addition, size-based measures can be too high 
in countries with underdeveloped banking sectors since money is the only means to 
store value in the absence of attractive alternatives (Svaleryd & Vlachos, 2002). 
Moreover these measures do not distinguish between credit allocated to the 
government and that to the private sector (Klein & Olivei, 2008); however credit 
allocated to the government may reduce the resources available to the private sector 
thereby adversely affecting private investment. 
Another measure of banking sector development is the ratio of deposit money 
bank assets to total assets of deposit money banks plus the central bank. The intuition 
behind this measure is that deposit money banks are more likely to identify profitable 
investments, monitor managers and mobilize savings than central banks (Levine, et 
al., 2000). However not all bank assets are directed to the productive sector.  
Credit issued by deposit money banks to the private sector (as a percentage of 
GDP) is another measure of banking sector development. This measure excludes 
credit issued to the government and government agencies as well as credit issued by 
the central bank and development banks (Levine, et al., 2000; Y. Huang, 2010). And 
it is relevant for measuring opportunities for new firms to obtain finance (Rajan & 
Zingales, 2003). Besides, there are other measures that focus on banking efficiency 
such as overhead cost
4
 and bank net interest margin
5
 (Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 
2001).  
Since the study is interested in the ability of the banking sector to allocate 
credit to the private sector, it employs private sector credit (PC) as a proxy to banking 
sector development
6
. Besides, this measure overcomes the disadvantages of sized-
                                                                                                                                                        
agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, commercial paper, and shares 
of mutual funds or market funds held by residents. 
4
It is calculated as operating expenses of a bank as a share of the value of all held assets.  
5
Accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a share of its average interest-bearing (total 
earning) assets. 
6
It is employed by several empirical studies to proxy banking sector development (Arestis and 
Demetriades, 1997; Levine, 1998; Shan, Morris and Sun, 2001; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 2002; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2002; Law and Demetriades, 2006; Djankov, McLiesh, and 
Shleifer, 2007; Klein and Olivei, 2008; Law, 2008; Tressel and Detragiache, 2008; Law, 2009; Law 
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based measures.  
Therefore, the study examines the determinants of banking sector development 
over the period 2000-2009 in a panel sample of 18 emerging countries
7
 according to 
the IMF classification of 2009 (Ghosh, Chamon, Crowe, Kim, & Ostry, 2009). The 
IMF classifies them as countries that are neither part of the advanced economies nor 
of the low-income countries eligible for Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
(PRGT)
8
. The main feature of emerging countries is their transitional character in the 
economic, institutional and political dimensions (Mody, 2004). The 18 emerging 
countries are selected from four different regional groupings: Middle East and Africa 
includes Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and South Africa; Asia includes India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand; Europe includes Turkey and 
the Russian Federation; and Latin America and Caribbean includes Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico and Peru. 
The following figure depicts a considerable variation in the pattern of banking 
sector development proxied by private sector credit over the period 2000-2009; 
ranging from 15.8% in Mexico to a high of 109.4% in Malaysia on average. Whilst 
there is an upward trend of private sector credit in the majority of countries, there is a 
significant downward trend in Malaysia and Thailand whereas in Egypt and Tunisia 
and the Phillipines there is a mild decrease. In addition the rate of change over the 
period under study varies significantly.  
                                                                                                                                                        
and Habibullah, 2009; Assane and Malamud, 2010; Y. Huang, 2010; Yu and Gan, 2010; Aggarwal, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Pería, 2011; Oke, Uadiale and Okpala, 2011; Becerra, Cavallo, and Scartascini, 2012). 
7
Since there is a lack of data on institutional characteristics and banking liberalization reforms in 
emerging countries, only 18 countries are examined.  
8
A number of definitions are used by several entities such as Morgan Stanley, Standard and Poors, and 
Dow Jones.  
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Figure (1): Private Sector Credit (% of GDP) (2000-2009) by Region 
              a)  Middle East and Africa    b) Asia 
  
              c) Europe                                      d) Latin America and Caribbean 
 
Source: Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).  
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Importance of the Study 
As mentioned previously banking sector is critical for the whole economy. In 
addition, having underdeveloped banking sector can hinder the development process. 
Emerging economies rely on  the banking sectors as the main providor of the finance 
required for new investment opportunities.  Therefore, the main objective of the study 
is to investigate the factors that affect banking sector development in emerging 
economies and determine the policies that can accelerate it where it lags behind. In 
addition the study examines the relationship between different financial system 
pillars, namely banking sectors and capital markets in order to assess whether they are 
complementing or competing with each other. 
Banking sector development is proxied by private sector credit which captures 
the capacity of credit allocation to the private sector; however this measure may fail to 
capture the complete picture of the banking sector. Private sector credit does not take 
into consideration the quality of credit provided; the households’ access to financial 
services; or the efficiency of the banking sector in performing its functions. Therefore, 
in order to get a deeper insight into other aspects affecting banking sector 
development, the study conducts an analytical examination addressing four main 
characteristics of the banking sector which are: depth, access, efficiency and stability. 
In what follows, Section II reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on 
the determinants of banking sector development. Section III conducts an analytical 
examination to the banking sectors of the sample during 2000-2009. Section IV 
explains the methodology and describes the data and the empirical model. Section V 
presents the estimation results. Finally, Section VI concludes.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Theoretical Review 
Theories about the importance of finance in the economy can be traced back to Locke 
(1695), Smith (1776), Bentham (1787), Bagehot (1873) and Schumpeter (1912, 
p.102) who states that "He can only become an entrepreneur by previously becoming 
a debtor". However in the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the dominant theory was in 
support of neutral or even negative effect of finance on growth (as cited in Fry, 1995). 
Robinson (1952) argues that finance responds to changes in the real sector. Moreover, 
Lucas (1988) believes that finance is not a significant determinant of growth.  
Countries used to repress their banking sectors through imposing interest rate 
ceilings following the work of Keynes, Tobin and Structuralist Economists
9
. In his 
liquidity preference, Keynes (1936) shows that people may hold money for 
speculative reasons if they are expecting the market value of an alternative asset such 
as bonds will fall. The preference of people to hold money instead of productive 
capital leads to inadequate level of investment thereby output. Therefore, imposing an 
interest rate ceiling keeps the prices of bonds from decreasing, leading to a higher 
investment level. However this solution ignores the inflationary consequences. In 
1965, Tobin develops the portfolio allocation model. He explains that if the return on 
capital relative to money rises, households will increase the ratio of capital to money 
leading to higher capital/labor ratio, higher labor productivity hence higher economic 
growth. Then reducing deposit rates increases welfare. In addition, Sturcturalists and 
Neostructuralists argue that higher interest rates lead to higher inflation in the short 
run thus reduces the supply of credit in real terms required to finance investment 
which will lower economic growth rates (Fry, 1995). 
In 1973 the dominant theory of financial repression was forcefully challenged. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) analyze developing countries that are financially 
repressed. They find that imposing constraints over the banking sector such as interest 
rate ceilings results in negative real interest rates which lead to the reduction of 
                                                      
9
Structural economics emphasizes that the structural features of the economy need to be taken into 
account in the analysis of the economic development process as well as the role of the state in it (Lin, 
2011). 
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savings below the socially optimum level thereby investment. In addition credit 
rationing programs lead to further reduction of investments as well as the productivity 
of capital. Moreover governments impose excessively high reserve requirements on 
banks, usually at low or even zero interest rates, in order to finance their own deficits 
cheaply. However, high reserve requirements act as a tax on the banking system, 
resulting in further depression of interest rates. Therefore they conclude that financial 
liberalization is critical for banking sector development thereby growth. 
Endogenous growth literature also predicts that financial repression in the 
form of discriminatory taxes on financial intermediation negatively affects financial 
development and reduces economic growth. King and Levine (1993a) show that 
financial sector taxation is equivalent to taxation on innovative activities. By lowering 
the net returns gained by financial intermediaries from financing entrepreneurs, the 
financial services provided will be reduced as well. “Financial repression… impedes 
innovative activity and slows economic growth” (King & Levine 1993a, p.517).   
Over the past three decades, heeding the advice of McKinnon and Shaw, many 
countries witnessed a wave of financial liberalization in order to develop well-
functioning banking sectors (Tressel & Detragiache, 2008). However the question 
remains: why did some countries succeed in developing well-functioning banking 
sectors, while others did not? Hence theories were developed to examine other 
determinants of financial development. 
A strand of the literature focuses on the political incentives for financial 
development. The interest group theory proposed by Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
suggests that development of the banking sector as well as the capital market foster 
competition and allow the entry of credit-constrained firms. Therefore, incumbent 
interest groups oppose financial development. However their opposition is weaker in 
case of liberal trade policies and free cross-borders capital flows. Haber, North, and 
Weingast (2008) show that the government may have an incentive to hinder financial 
development so that it can draw resources from banks and capital markets resulting in 
lax financial markets. Becerra, Cavallo, and Scartascini (2012) build on these 
contributions by constructing a theoretical model suggesting that the intensity of 
opposition to financial development is determined by the degree of credit dependency 
by incumbents as well as the government’s ability to avoid distorting the financial 
system. They provide empirical evidence for their claim in a sample of developed and 
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developing countries. Their results show that lower opposition fosters financial 
development only in those countries with high government capabilities; and 
improvements in government capabilities has an impact only in those countries in 
which credit dependency is high. 
The literature also highlights the role of institutions in enhancing financial 
development. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that property rights institutions, 
which protect against government and elite expropriation, as well as contracting 
institutions, which regulate transactions between private parties such as a debtor and a 
creditor, have a major influence on financial development. 
B. Empirical Review 
The determinants of banking sector development receive great attention in the 
empirical literature as well. A strand of the literature focuses on macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP per capita, inflation and remittances. On the other hand, recent 
studies focus on financial policies and reforms; legal and political institutions; and 
trade policies as the main determinants of banking sector development. However the 
results provide mixed evidence still. Some empirical studies focus on the capital 
market development besides the banking sector. Moreover, the degree of banking 
sector development is proxied by different measures such as: liquid liabilities, bank 
credit to the private sector, money and quasi-money (M2), and deposit money bank 
assets. In addition, few studies construct composite indices and indicators to measure 
financial development (Cuadro, Gallego & García Herrero, 2003; Y. Huang and 
Temple, 2005; W. Huang, 2006, and Sharma & Nguyen, 2010). Appendix (A) 
includes further elaboration on the empirical literature.  The following section reviews 
the empirical literature on the determinants of banking sector development. 
1. Financial Liberalization 
Demetriades and Luintel (1996) show that controls over the Indian banking sector 
such as interest rates ceiling, liquidity and reserve requirements and directed lending 
programs, have a negative impact on financial depth; except lending rate ceiling 
which has a small positive impact. Arestis, Demetriades, Fattouh, and Mouratidis 
(2002) also examine the impact of financial repression proxied by interest rate 
restraints and reserve requirement and liquidity ratios, on banking sector development 
in six developing countries (Egypt, Greece, Thailand, Philippines, Korea, and India). 
9 
 
They find that banking liberalization policies have significant positive effect however 
this effect varies across countries. They conclude that this variation may reflect 
institutional differences. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) use 
government ownership of banks as an indicator of repressed banking sectors. They 
find that government ownership of banks in poor countries is associated with slower 
banking sector development as well as slower economic growth.  
Tressel and Detragiache (2008), using a dataset of developing and developed 
countries, find that liberalization reforms
10
 lead to banking sector development, 
proxied by the ratio of private credit to GDP, in the long run but only in countries 
with institutions that protect property rights. Obamuyi and Demehin (2012) also find a 
significant impact of interest rate reforms on banking sector development in Nigeria. 
With regard to financial openness, W. Huang (2006) examines the effect of 
financial openness
11
 on financial development
12
 in a panel of emerging markets. He 
finds that financial openness explains cross-country differences in the development of 
the financial system. Moreover, Law (2008) finds that capital account openness is a 
positively significant determinant of banking sector development in Malaysia. In 
addition, Klein and Olivei (2008) find that liberalization of capital accounts has a 
significant impact on banking sector development in the presence of institutional 
infrastructure. Also, Abzari, Zarei and Esfahani (2011) find that foreign direct 
investment (FDI) leads to banking sector development in a sample of developing 
countries. Whereas, Erosy (2011) finds that financial openness, measured by FDI 
inflows and portfolio investment, is in a long run equilibrium relationship with 
banking sector development in Turkey, however the causality runs in one direction 
from banking sector development to financial openness.  
On the other hand, Arestis, and Demetriades (1997) develop an indicator of 
financial repression
13
. They find a positive effect of financial repression policies on 
banking sector development in South Korea. Their finding is consistent with the 
                                                      
10
They used an index of domestic banking reforms constructed by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel 
(2008). This index measures banking reforms in five areas (credit controls and reserves requirements, 
interest rate controls, entry barriers, state-ownership and banking supervision). 
11
He uses an aggregate index for financial openness including: stock market openness, FDI, and private 
capital flows.  
12
It is measured by an index that aggregate groups of financial indicators from the banking sector and 
the capital market.  
13
It is a weighted index of banking sector controls such as interest rate ceilings, directed credit 
programs and high reserve requirements.  
10 
 
monopoly banking model under which profit maximizing volume of deposits 
increases with a lending rate ceiling. Similarly, Yu and Gan (2010) find that financial 
liberalization
14
 has a negative impact on banking sector development in Malaysia. 
Their results indicate that financial liberalization should come in a later stage, when 
adequate institutions and sound macroeconomic policies are already in place. 
2. Institutions 
Several empirical studies emphasize the role of legal and institutional characteristics 
such as: rule of law, creditors’ rights, property rights, corruption, executive 
constraints, political stability, etc., in explaining the variation of banking sector 
development across countries. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) and Levine (1998) use a dataset of developing and developed countries divided 
by their legal origin. They find that legal rules protecting creditor rights and their 
enforcement have a robust impact on banking sector development. Cuadro, et al. 
(2003) examine the impact of two factors, namely the central bank role
15
 and bank 
regulation and supervision
16
 on financial development
17
 using a dataset of industrial 
and emerging countries. The results reveal that large involvement of the central bank in 
the financial system contributes to financial development in all countries. Moreover, high 
quality regulation and supervision, particularly supervisors’ independence, is beneficial in 
industrial countries. However, in emerging countries, supervisors’ independence will only 
contribute to financial development in the presence of strong rule of law.  
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) find that creditor’s protection and 
information-sharing institutions are significant determinants of banking sector 
development. Law and Habibullah (2009) find that institutional quality
18
 and real 
GDP per capita are significant determinants of banking sector development in a panel 
data of developing and developed countries. In addition, Assane and Malamud (2010), 
using a sample of Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA), try to analyze the impact of 
legal origin and membership in the Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) 
                                                      
14
It is proxied by an index constructed by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001). 
15
Central bank role includes: involvement in payments system, lender of last resort and Central bank 
objectives. 
16
Regulation and supervision includes: quality of Regulation, supervisory Enforcement and 
independence of supervisors. 
17
Cuadro, et al. (2003) construct a new measure of financial development which includes several 
indicators of financial size and efficiency for 134 countries. 
18
They use five indicators to proxy institutional quality constructed by Political Risk Services which 
are: corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, government repudiation of contracts, and risk of 
expropriation.  
11 
 
currency union on banking sector development and economic growth. They show that 
banking sector development is higher in English legal origin SSA compared to French 
legal SSA. Moreover, banking sector development contributes positively to growth in 
English legal origin SSA. On the other hand, banking sector development has a 
negative or an insignificant impact on growth in French legal origin SSA. In addition, 
they find that membership in the CFA currency union hinders banking sector 
development.  
Moreover, Y. Huang (2010) find a significant effect of institutional 
improvements
19
 on banking sector development at least in the short-run, especially for 
lower income countries and French legal origin countries using a panel dataset of 90 
developed and developing countries. Sharma and Nguyen (2010) also emphasize on 
the direct relationship between law enforcement quality
20
 and banking sector 
development
21
 using a sample of developed and developing countries; however they 
show that creditor’s rights may not be as influential as had been thought previously. 
With regard to political instability, Roe and Siegel (2011) provide evidence 
that it impedes financial development. Voghouei, Azali and Law (2011) examine the 
effect of political power in establishing economic institutions
22
 that are important for 
financial development. Two groups of variables are employed to proxy political 
power: political institutions and distribution of resources
23
. By using a panel of 
developing and developed counties, the empirical results show that political power is 
a significant determinant of economic institutions, hence positively affects financial 
development.  
3. Trade Openness 
Studies on the relationship between trade openness and banking sector development 
                                                      
19
Institutional improvements are proxied by an indicator from the PolityIV Database (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2009) which proxies the degree of democracy and measures the institutional quality based on 
the freedom of suffrage, operational constraints and balances on executives, and respect for other basic 
political rights and civil liberties. 
20
It includes efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation and the 
likelihood of repudiation by government. 
21
They constructed an index of banking sector development which is a weighted average of the ratios of 
bank assets, private sector credit and liquid liabilities to GDP. 
22
Economic institutions variables are corruption, bureaucratic quality, government repudiation of 
contracts, risk of expropriation, and rule of law.  
23
The political institutions variables are executive recruitment and executive constraints, political 
competition, political checks and balances and political transparency; and the distribution of resources 
is proxied by the Gini coefficient.  
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provide mixed results. Y. Huang and Temple (2005) construct an indicator
24
 to 
measure the overall financial development. Their results show that trade openness has 
significant positive impact on financial development especially for lower income 
countries. Law and Demetriades (2006) and Law (2009) show that trade openness and 
financial openness are significant determinants of financial development in 
developing countries. They suggested that openness leads to higher development 
through better institutional quality. Kim, Lin, Suen (2010) find a positive impact of 
trade openness on banking sector development in lower-income countries however 
they find a negative long-run and insignificant short-run impacts in high-income 
countries.  
Whereas, Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) find a significant relationship between 
trade openness and banking sector as well as capital market development with 
causation running in both directions. On the other hand, Bordo and Rousseau (2011) 
do not find a significant relationship between trade and financial development for 17 
advanced economies.  
4. Workers’ Remittances 
Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt and Pería (2011); Chowdhury (2011); and Oke, Uadiale 
and Okpala (2011) focus on developing countries. They concluded that remittances 
have a significant positive impact on banking sector development. 
5. Economic Growth 
A vast majority of the literature focus on the growth-finance nexus. However the 
direction of causation between growth and financial development remains 
inconclusive. The findings of Arestis and Demetriades (1997) confirm a positive 
impact of growth on banking sector and capital market development in the USA while 
there is a unidirectional causality from financial development to growth in Germany. 
Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) show that growth leads finance in developing 
countries, because of the increasing demand for financial services. 
On the other hand, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Shan, Morris and Sun 
(2001) find evidence on bidirectional causality between growth and financial 
development. Whereas, Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) find that the direction of 
                                                      
24
This indicator is based on eight components: liquid liabilities, private sector credit, commercial bank 
assets, net interest margin, market capitalization, value of traded shares and turnover ratio. 
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the relationship is from finance to growth. 
It is clear that the literature on the determinants of banking sector 
development, while agreeing on the positive significant impact of institutional quality 
and remittances, provide mixed evidence on the rest of the determinants. Moreover 
the causality between banking sector development and economic growth, trade 
openness, as well as financial openness remains questionable.  
Research Problem 
Emerging economies aim at establishing a well-functioning banking sector capable of 
mobilizing savings and channeling them to productive investments. Thus, the study 
examines the determinants of banking sector development in a sample of 18 emerging 
economies. In accordance with the literature, the study employs four groups of 
determinants: financial liberalization including banking sector liberalization, and 
capital account openness; institutional and legal characteristics including rule of law, 
freedom from corruption, property rights protection and legal origin; macroeconomic 
variables including remittances, real GDP per capita, and inflation in addition to 
openness to trade. Section IV provides details on the determinants employed.  
While accomplishing this goal, the study employs a proxy to capital market 
development to examine whether it complements banking sector development or 
competes with it in emerging countries. The study uses panel estimation methods 
which are: Random Effect, Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), and Dynamic 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimations. 
Thesis Statement 
The study addresses the following main questions with respect to emerging 
economies:  
What are the main determinants of banking sector development?  
Does the capital market compete with or complement the banking sector? 
What are the main characteristics of the banking sector in emerging countries? 
The first two questions are tackled in Section IV. While in the following 
section, the study addresses the third question in order to shed the light on other 
characteristics of the banking sector not assessed by private sector credit which are: 
depth, access, efficiency and stability. 
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III. ANALYTICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING 
SECTOR 
The study employs private sector credit as a proxy to banking sector development; 
however this measure does not provide the complete information on banking sector 
development. First, it does not take into consideration non-performing loans and the 
quality of credit allocated. Second, it does not capture the access to bank finance by 
the household sector.  Third, it fails to capture the efficiency and the profitability of 
banks. Finally it does not provide information on the stability of the banking sector. 
When banking sectors perform poorly according to these dimensions, they tend to 
hinder economic growth which may lead to economic crises.  
Therefore, in this section the study conducts an analytical examination to the 
banking sectors of the sample during 2000-2009 addressing the four main 
characteristics which are: depth, access, efficiency and stability
25
. Data are presented 
in Appendix (C).  
A. Banking Depth 
Banking depth is regarded as the measure of the size of the banking sector relative to 
the overall size of the economy. This dimension consists of the traditional financial 
aggregates (M2, bank deposits, deposit money bank assets and central bank assets) as 
a percentage to GDP. The level of banking depth is widely dispersed across the 
sample e.g. the percentage of M2 to GDP is 25% in Ecuador compared to 132% in 
Malaysia on average. In comparison with high-income countries (HICs) reporting a 
value of 121%, the percentage of M2 to GDP in the sample amounts to 76%. With 
regard to deposit money bank assets, the sample reports a value of 59% while HICs 
reports a value of 102%. As a result, depth indicators are found to be proportional to 
the country’s income level.  
The percentage of central bank assets to GDP in Egypt is the highest across 
the sample reaching 30% on average. This is attributed to the increase in both net 
foreign assets
26
 and net domestic assets. Net domestic assets increased due to the 
                                                      
25 Data reported are the average of the period 2000-2009. 
26 Net foreign assets decreased in FY 2010/2011 due to the decrease in foreign exchange reserves 
(CBE, 2011). 
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increase of the central bank net claims on the government; and the decline in 
government deposits. In addition, the central bank net claims on banks went up as 
well (Central Bank of Egypt [CBE], 2010).  
B. Banking Access 
A well-functioning banking sector provides financial services to a wide range of firms 
and households. HICs have on average twice more bank branches and automated 
teller machines (ATMs) per 100,000 adult than the sample. The degree of access 
varies widely across the sample as well, where Brazil has on average 10 times more 
bank branches per 100,000 adult than Egypt and 20 times more ATMs per 100,000. 
Still, access to financial services in the sample is growing. The average number of 
bank branches per 100,000 adult increased by about 60% during 2004–2009 whereas 
growth of bank branches was stagnant in HICs. 
C. Banking Efficiency 
This dimension focuses on the ability of banks to intermediate resources and facilitate 
financial transactions efficiently (Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, & Levine, 2012). It 
includes three groups of variables: profitability, efficiency and competitiveness 
measures. With regard to return on assets, this measure stands at 1% on average 
however Ecuador reports a negative value for this ratio (-1.7%) which indicates that 
its banking sector has achieved losses
27
. 
However the performance of the banking sectors on other profitability 
measures such as return on equity (11%) and net interest margin (3%) is close to HICs 
(12%), (1.8%) respectively on average. Nevertheless profitable banks are not 
necessarily efficient. For example, the ratio of overhead costs to total assets is high 
compared to HICs, reaching the double. Moreover lending-deposit spread reaches 
two-digit values in Peru (20%) and Brazil (39%) which is an indicator to inefficiency. 
High lending-deposit spread discourages savers because of low returns on deposits 
thereby decreasing financing opportunities for potential borrowers (Tennant and 
Folawewo, 2009).  
Bank concentration ratio
28
 ranges from 33% in India to 82% in South Africa 
on average. In 2000, bank concentration ratio in the Philippines was 100% however 
                                                      
27 In 2000, ROA in Ecuador stood at -11.8 however the performance improved in following years 
reporting a value of 1.3% in 2009.  
28
It consists of the assets of the three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banks 
assets. 
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this ratio decreased to reach 43% in 2009 indicating the reduction of entry barriers.  
With regard to foreign banks, Mexico, Pakistan and Peru report high percentage of 
foreign bank assets to total banks assets, exceeding 40% on average. In Egypt, the 
percentage of foreign banks to total banks exceeds 40% on average however they 
account for only 19% of total assets. 
Another competitiveness measure is the Boone indicator
29
. This indicator 
measures the degree of competition based on profit-efficiency in the banking sector. It 
is calculated as the elasticity of profits to marginal costs therefore a positive Boone 
indicator implies a deterioration of the competitiveness of banks. The Boone indicator 
is negative for all countries except for Chile and Malaysia in 2009. In addition, this 
indicator is positive in Tunisia during the period under study indicating a weak 
competitive conduct of the Tunisian banking sector. 
D. Banking Stability 
Stability is an important feature of the banking sector. Banking stability is crucial for 
broader macroeconomic stability. One of the banking stability measures is the ratio of 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets which measures the capital adequacy of 
deposit takers. Capital adequacy and availability ultimately determine the degree of 
robustness of banks to weather shocks to their balance sheets. Banking sectors of the 
sample have a high capital adequacy ratio which stands at 15% on average whereas 
Basel III recommends that this ratio should be at least 8% which may indicate the 
desire of banks to implement stronger prudential regulations. This ratio stands at 12% 
in HICs. 
Another measure is the percentage of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to gross 
loans which is a proxy to asset quality. The sample performs poorly on this indicator 
(8%) compared to the averages of middle-income countries (MICs) (7%) and HICs 
(2.5%). Tunisia (20%) and Egypt (19%) report the highest ratios of NPLs while Chile 
reports the lowest ratio (1.4%).  
The ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short term funding is intended to 
capture the liquidity mismatch of assets and liabilities, and the extent to which deposit 
takers can meet the short-term withdrawal of funds without facing liquidity 
constraints. Liquid asset ratio of the sample (30%) is slightly less than MICs (35%) 
                                                      
29 The rationale behind this indicator is that higher profits are achieved by more efficient banks. Hence, 
the more negative the Boone indicator, the higher the degree of competition is because the effect of 
reallocation is stronger (Global Financial Development Report, 2012).  
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and HICs (34%) on average.  
A key measure of the stability of the banking sector is the Z-score
30
 which 
captures the probability of default of the banking sector. It compares a bank’s equity 
capital and returns with the volatility of those returns. The Z-score of the banking 
sectors in the sample stands at 21 which is higher than that of MICs (15) and HICs 
(18) except Pakistan (8.5) and Thailand (3.4) where the Z-scores are very low 
indicating higher probability of insolvency.  
The characteristics of the banking sectors vary significantly across the sample 
however the majority of them can be regarded as deep banking sectors whereas the 
ability of individuals and firms to access their financial services is constrained 
compared to MICs and HICs still. Moreover, although most of them are profitable 
compared to HICs, they are less efficient. In addition these banking sectors are 
characterized by stability compared to HICs with regard to capital adequacy, liquidity, 
and probability of default however their asset quality (proxied by NPLs) is considered 
poor.     
Correlation with Private Sector Credit 
Figure (2) shows the correlation between private sector credit and the four main 
characteristics of the banking sector proxied by selected indicators for the 18 
emerging countries. Private sector credit is weakly correlated with access (proxied by 
the number of bank branches and ATMs per 100,000 adult) and banking stability 
(proxied by Z-score). However it is highly correlated with banking depth (proxied by 
ratio of M2 to GDP), with a correlation coefficient =0.92. It is also highly correlated 
with banking inefficiency (proxied by the ratio of overhead cost), with a correlation 
coefficient=-0.66. Hence private sector credit is considered a proper proxy for 
banking sector development.  
  
                                                      
30 It is calculated as a weighted average of the Z-scores of a country's individual banks. 
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Figure (2): Correlation between Private Sector Credit and the Main Characteristics 
of the Banking Sector   
                 a) Depth                                        b) Access                                    
 
              c) Inefficiency                              d) Stability             
 
Data is averaged over 2000-2009 for the 18 emerging countries 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data collected from Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009); Financial 
Access Survey, IMF (2012); Global Financial Development Report, World Bank (2012); and World 
Development Indicators, World Bank (2012) 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 50 100 150
P
ri
v
at
e 
C
re
d
it
 t
o
 G
D
P
 (
%
) 
M2 to GDP(%) 
correlation=0.92 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 50 100 150
P
ri
v
at
e 
cr
ed
it
 t
o
 G
D
P
 (
%
) 
Bank Branches+ATM (per 100,000 
Adult) 
correlation=0.11 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 2 4 6 8
P
ri
v
at
e 
cr
ed
it
 t
o
 G
D
P
(%
) 
Overhead costs to total assets(%) 
correlation=-0.66 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 20 40 60
P
ri
v
at
e 
cr
ed
it
 t
o
 G
D
P
(%
) 
Bank Z-score 
correlation=0.11 
19 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. Model Specification 
According to the models of Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and the endogenous 
growth literature (King and Levine, 1993a, b), financial development is a positive 
function of real income and real interest rate. Hence banking sector development 
function can be specified as: 
PC= f(RGDPC, RIR)                     (1) 
Where PC is private sector credit provided by deposit money banks (as a 
percentage of GDP) as a proxy to banking sector development, RGDPC is the real 
GDP per capita while RIR is the real interest rate. However, the real interest rate is 
omitted from the model specification
31
. Firstly, the sign of the real interest rate is 
partially a political decision depending on the determination of nominal interest rates. 
Secondly, data for this variable is inconsistent for developing and emerging 
countries
32
 (Law and Habibullah, 2009). Finally, the examined determinants include 
inflation which is highly collinear with real interest rate.   
In order to investigate other variables that could influence private sector credit, 
Equation (1) is then extended as follows
33,34
:  
ln PCit= β0i +  β1iBLit+ β2i CLit+ β3i LAW + β4i PRP + β5i FCORit + β6i FLOi + β7i TOit + β8i 
REMit + β9i ln RGDPCit + β10i INFit + β11i MCAPit + εit  i=1,…,18 and t=1,…,10       (2) 
Where BL is banking sector liberalization, CL is capital account liberalization, 
LAW is rule of law, PRP is property rights protection, FCOR is freedom from 
corruption, FLO is a dummy for French legal origin and TO is trade openness. 
Macroeconomic determinants are real GDP per capita (RGDPC), remittances received 
(REM) and Inflation (INF). In addition, MCAP is stock market capitalization as a 
proxy to capital market development. And εit is the idiosyncratic error term. 
  
                                                      
31
The majority of the empirical studies examining banking sector development do not include real 
interest rate in their model specification. 
32
Data for real interest rate is not available for all countries in the sample during 2000-2009. 
33
Private sector credit and real GDP per capita are transformed into natural log depending on their 
graphical representations to smooth high variation across the sample. 
34
The relationship is assumed to be linear.  
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B. The Data 
The data set consists of balanced panel of observations for a sample of 18 emerging 
economies for the period 2000-2009. The dependent variable is banking sector 
development proxied by private sector credit (as % of GDP). This variable is collected 
from the database constructed by Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009).  
As for the explanatory variables, Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and the 
endogenous growth literature show that financial liberalization promotes financial 
development, therefore the study examines the impact of banking sector liberalization 
proxied by credit market regulation index derived from Gwartney, Lawson and Hall 
(2011). This index focuses on regulatory restraints that limit the freedom of exchange 
in credit. It is the simple average of four sub-indices that track the presence of 
restrictions in the following areas (ownership of banks, foreign bank competition, 
private sector credit and interest rate controls). However the study will recalculate the 
index after eliminating the sub-index of private sector credit to avoid collinearity. The 
index ranges from zero to ten where more liberalized banking sectors receive higher 
scores. Other indices were used in the literature to proxy banking sector liberalization 
such as financial liberalization indices constructed by Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2003), and an index of domestic banking reforms from Abiad, Detragiache and 
Tressel (2008); however these indices do not cover the period under study. 
Klein and Olivei (2008) and Law (2009) find that capital account 
liberalization has a significant impact on banking sector development. Thus capital 
account liberalization is added to the determinants proxied by capital account 
openness index developed by Chinn and Ito (2008). It is a de-jure measure that 
attempts to measure the intensity of capital controls. 
Theory and empirical studies agree that strong legal systems capable of 
enforcing contracts and protecting investors are robust determinant of banking sector 
development. Therefore the study adds the rule of law to the explanatory variable. It is 
proxied by the index for the integrity of the legal system constructed by Gwartney, et 
al. (2011). It assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system; and the 
popular observance of the law. The rule of law index ranges from zero to ten where 
stronger legal systems receive higher scores.  
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If countries have weak property rights, they are likely to suffer a reduction in 
the amount and efficiency of investment in physical and human capital as investors 
will channel their resources to activities that are more secure from the threat of 
expropriation such as trade (Knack and Kiefer, 1995). Hence, the study uses the 
Heritage Foundation property rights index which measures the degree to which a 
country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree of their enforcement. It 
also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and analyzes the 
independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the 
ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. This index ranges from 0 to 
100 where higher values are given to countries that protect property rights more 
effectively.   
Investors in countries with corrupt governments are hindered by uncertainty 
regarding the credibility of government commitments which results in discouraging 
investment (Knack and Kiefer, 1995). Thus, the study adds the Heritage Foundation 
freedom from corruption index to the determinants of banking sector development.  
The score of this index is derived primarily from Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2010, which measures the level of corruption 
in 178 countries. The score of the freedom from corruption index ranges from 0 to 
100 where 100 indicates very little corruption while 0 indicates a very corrupt 
government.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) find that, compared to English 
legal origin, French legal origin is associated first with lower investor protection 
which in turn leads to a less developed financial system, and lower access to finance; 
second with heavier government ownership and regulation, which may lead to greater 
corruption, and larger unofficial economy; and finally with higher formalism and less 
independent judicial systems, which result in unsecured property rights and weaker 
contract enforcement. Therefore the determinants under study include a dummy for 
the French legal origin however a dummy for the English legal origin is not added to 
the analysis to avoid collinearity. Data for legal origin is collected from La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998b). 
The interest group theory and other empirical studies have highlighted the 
positive influence of trade openness on banking sector development (Svaleryd & 
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Vlachos, 2002; Y. Huang & Temple, 2005; Law & Demetriades, 2006; Law, 2008, 
2009). Thus the study examines trade openness proxied by total trade (as % of GDP). 
Moreover remittances are considered the second most important flow after foreign 
direct investment to emerging countries. However the impact of remittances on 
banking sector development remains inconclusive in theory. On one hand, it is argued 
that remittances recipients may demand financial products to store their excess funds. 
On the other hand, remittances can have a dampening effect on banking sector 
development through improving individuals' financial positions as a result they will 
demand less credit. In addition, remittances may be immediately consumed 
(Aggarwal, Demirguc-Kunt, & Peria, 2011). Therefore, workers’ received remittances 
are added to the explanatory variables. It is the sum of three items defined in the fifth 
edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual: workers' remittances, 
compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers. It is measured as a percentage of 
GDP.  
The literature suggests that economic growth bolsters banking sector 
development (Arestis & Demetriades, 1997; Shan, et al., 2001; and Hassan, et al., 
2011). Hence, the study uses annual data for real GDP per capita based on constant 
prices of 2000 in USD
35
. Moreover, empirical evidence shows that inflation 
significantly reduces banking sector development (Boyd, Levine, & Smith, 2001) thus 
the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator is added to the explanatory 
variables as a measure of inflation. The source of the four above mentioned variables 
is the World Development Indicators.  
In addition, the study employs stock market capitalization of listed companies 
as a proxy to capital market development to assess the relationship between capital 
markets and banking sectors in emerging countries. Data on this variable is collected 
from the database constructed by Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009). Appendix (B) 
presents the definition and the source of each variable.  
                                                      
35 Real GDP per capita proxies economic in several studies  such as Demetriades and Luintel (1996), 
Arestis, and Demetriades (1997), Levine (1998), Shan, et al. (2001), Arestis, et al. (2002), Svaleryd 
and Vlachos (2002), Cuadro, et al. (2003), Y. Huang and Temple (2005), Law and Demetriades (2006), 
Djankov, et al. (2007), Law (2008), Tressel and Detragiache (2008), Law (2009), Law and Habibullah 
(2009), Assane and Malamud (2010), Y. Huang (2010), Aggarwal, et al. (2011), Chowdhury (2011), 
Voghouei, et al. (2011), Becerra, et al. (2012). 
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table (1) reports summary statistics of the variables employed in the analysis. The 
dependent variable, private sector credit, ranges from 10.86% in the Russian 
Federation to a high of 127.56% in Malaysia indicating high sample variation in the 
degree of banking sector development. 
As for the explanatory variables, market capitalization ratio and trade 
openness show considerable variation with standard deviations of 66% and 43% 
respectively. Market capitalization ranges from 3.52% in Ecuador to a high of 338.2% 
in South Africa. While trade openness ranges from 21.7% in Brazil to 220.4 % in 
Malaysia. 
Real GDP per capita also shows significant variation with a standard deviation 
of USD 1644. Mexico has the highest real GDP per capita, i.e. USD 6333.08, whereas 
India has the lowest real GDP per capita at USD 450.42. 
Table (2) reports the correlation analysis which reveals that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between trade openness and banking sector 
development (0.78) followed by freedom from corruption (0.57), property rights 
protection (0.45), rule of law (0.29) and real GDP per capita (0.19). On the other 
hand, Inflation is negatively correlated with banking sector development (-0.36) 
followed by French legal origin dummy (-0.34). Moreover Table (2) shows that 
banking sector development and capital market development are significantly 
correlated (0.59). 
For the cross-correlation between explanatory variables, there is a significant 
relationship between real GDP per capita and freedom from corruption (0.6) followed 
by property rights protection (0.55). In addition, freedom from corruption and 
property rights protection are significantly correlated (0.75). 
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Table (1) Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
PC 
45.93 28.15 10.86 127.56 
BL 
7.2 1.44 3.1 10.00 
CL 
0.27 1.38 -1.86 2.46 
TO 
73.51 42.98 21.72 220.41 
REM 5.004 0.001 22.397 5.584 
LAW 5.83 1.75 3.3 10.00 
PRP 46.94 15.15 25.00 90.00 
FCOR 37.08 12.95 17.00 75.00 
FLO 0.667 0.472 0.00 1.00 
MCAP 70.97 66.19 3.52 338.2 
RGDPC 2654.21 1644.13 450.42 6333.08 
INF 7.56 7.83 -7.04 52.86 
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Table (2) Correlations 
 PC BL CL TO REM LAW PRP FCOR FLO MCAP RGDPC INF 
PC 1.00            
BL 0.11 
(1.51) 
1.00 
 
          
CL -0.02 
(-0.30) 
0.09 
(1.20) 
1.00          
TO 0.78 
(16.47)*** 
0.14 
(1.93) 
0.07 
(0.92) 
1.00         
REM 0.22 
(1.31) 
0.14 
(0.18) 
-0.21 
(3.56)*** 
0.31 
(3.29)*** 
1.00        
LAW 0.29 
(4.03)*** 
-0.07 
(-0.91) 
-0.09 
(-1.16) 
0.12 
(1.60) 
0.09 
(1.26) 
1.00       
PRP 0.45 
(6.69)*** 
0.13 
(1.78) 
0.12 
(1.64) 
0.23 
(3.08)*** 
-0.14 
(-1.62) 
0.33 
(4.65)*** 
1.00      
FCOR 0.57 
(9.30)*** 
0.33 
(4.64)*** 
0.16 
(2.17)* 
0.34 
(4.75)*** 
0.03 
(-0.39) 
0.41 
(5.94)*** 
0.75 
(14.92)*** 
1.00     
FLO -0.34 
(-4.80)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.60) 
0.49 
(7.51)*** 
-0.22 
(-3.02)*** 
-0.4 
(4.62)*** 
0.1 
(1.29) 
0.06 
(0.85) 
0.12 
(1.64) 
1.00    
MCAP 0.59 
(9.73)*** 
0.31 
(4.42)*** 
0.04 
(0.57) 
0.34 
(4.79)*** 
0.04 
(0.73) 
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
0.23 
(3.15)*** 
0.43 
(6.27)*** 
-0.33 
(-4.60)*** 
1.00   
RGDPC 0.19 
(2.52)** 
0.37 
(5.34)*** 
0.12 
(1.64) 
0.16 
(2.16)* 
-0.03 
(-5.44)*** 
0.07 
(0.999) 
0.55 
(8.81)*** 
0.6 
(10.04)*** 
0.16 
(2.19)* 
0.24 
(3.28)*** 
1.00  
INF -0.36 
(-5.08)*** 
-0.13 
(-1.71) 
-0.13 
(-1.71) 
-0.23 
(-3.08)*** 
0.02 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.1 
(-1.37) 
-0.03 
(-0.43) 
-0.2 
(-2.69)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.37) 
-0.11 
(-1.46) 
0.06 
(0.78) 
1.00 
Figures between parentheses are t-statistics for the correlation coefficients. ***, **, * indicates significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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C. Empirical Methodology 
1. Random Effect and Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
To examine the determinants of banking sector development, Equation (2) is estimated 
first by using fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) models. However according to 
Hausman test, the null hypothesis (H0) of no correlation between the unobserved effect 
and the regressors cannot be rejected (X
2
{10} = 12.95, P-value= 0.226). Therefore, the 
RE estimators are consistent and efficient. The results of the RE model is reported in 
Table (3), column (1)
36
. The study then proceeds to test for the possible presence of 
multicollinearity, cross-panel heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
i. Test for Multicollinearity and Test for Omitted Variables Significance 
Collinearity among explanatory variables may lead to overestimating the effect of some 
explanatory variables while under-estimating the effect of others. According to the RE 
estimation, real GDP per capita is insignificant on the contrary to the theory which may 
imply the presence of multicollinearity. Cases of near-collinearity can be detected by 
conducting auxiliary regressions. Regressing real GDP per capita on the rest of the 
explanatory variables shows that real GDP per capita is highly correlated with market 
capitalization and trade openness. Moreover, the correlation results reported in Table (2) 
reveal that freedom from corruption is highly correlated with property rights protection 
index and real GDP per capita. 
As a result, the model is re-estimated after omitting real GDP per capita and 
freedom from corruption. Then the study conducts a likelihood ratio test for each variable 
separately and together to show whether omitting these variables significantly reduces the 
fit of the model. The test shows that adding real GDP per capita and freedom from 
corruption to the explanatory variables results in a significant improvement in model fit 
(LR X
2
{2}=12.67, p-value= 0.002). Therefore, the study does not omit real GDP per 
capita or freedom from corruption.  
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Under RE estimation the intercepts vary while the slopes of parameters are common across panels. On the 
other hand, Random-coefficients models allow each panel to have its own vector of slopes randomly; 
however they can be enhanced in further research. 
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ii. Test for Cross-panel Heteroscedasticity 
The study uses Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for heteroscedasticity. The 
test rejects the H0 of constant residual variance across panels (X
2
= 248, p-value= 0.000) 
while the coefficient estimates can still be unbiased, estimated standard errors can be 
significantly misleading. Therefore, Equation (2) is re-estimated using robust panel 
standard errors proposed by the Huber-White sandwich method as most panel studies. 
The White (diagonal) method is argued to be robust to all forms of heteroscedasticity but 
it does not account for correlated residuals.  
The results of the RE model with White (diagonal) robust standard errors are 
presented in Table (3), column (2). The results in column (2) differ but not substantially 
from the RE model estimated without robust standard errors presented in column (1). 
There exist alterations in the standard errors. Moreover, the significance levels of trade 
openness and rule of law changed which implies the presence of heteroskedastic error 
structure. 
iii. Test for Autocorrelation 
Equation (2) needs to be tested for possible presence of autocorrelation in the error term. 
Autocorrelation may lead to biases in standard errors thereby less efficient estimators. 
The study uses a test derived by Wooldridge (2002, p.282-283). The test proceeds by 
testing the regression with first-differenced variables against their lags. In case of the 
absence of autocorrelation, then corr (Δεit, Δεit-1) = -0.5.   
An estimation of the Wooldridge test shows that the H0 of no first-order 
autocorrelation is rejected (F(1,17)= 148.7, p-value=0.00). Therefore, the model is re-
estimated using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation.   
FGLS allows estimation in the presence of AR (1) autocorrelation and 
heteroskedastic error structures across panels. The method relies on weighting each 
observation with a factor proportional to the inverse of its error variance. Thus, 
observations with higher variance are given smaller weights in the estimation. The FGLS 
model is estimated with standard errors normalized by n-k where n is the number of 
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observations and k is the number of parameters estimated
37
. The results are reported in 
Table (3), column (3).     
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure (1), there is a trend in the private sector credit of 
the sample over the period (2000-2009). Hence it is relevant to add a lagged dependent 
variable to the explanatory variables to account for the dynamic relationship. However, 
with lagged dependent variables, the FE estimator is inconsistent when the time span is 
small (Nickell, 1981) and the RE estimator is biased. Another potential problem is 
endogeneity. As mentioned previously, some studies find evidence on a bi-directional 
causality between banking sector development and economic growth (Demetriades & 
Hussein, 1996; Shan, et al., 2001). In this case, the assumption of strict exogeneity is 
violated therefore the RE and FGLS estimates are inconsistent. As a result, the model is 
re-estimated using dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
2. Dynamic Generalized Method of Moments  
After adding a lagged dependent variable to the explanatory variables to account for the 
dynamic relationship, the econometric model is rewritten in an autoregressive form as 
follows; 
Yit= αYi,t-1+ γXit + µi +uit                               where i=1,…,18 and t=2,…,10        (3) 
Where Yit is nx1 vector of observations of the dependent variable, Yi,t-1 is nx1 
vector of observations of the lagged dependent variable, Xit is nxn matrix of observations 
of the regressors, γ is nx1 vector of unknown parameters for the regressors, µi is the 
country specific effects, including legal origin dummies, and uit is nx1 vector of the error 
term. However there is a potential correlation between the lagged dependent variable and 
the error term as well as the country’s specific effects in Equation (3).  
The study estimates Equation (3) using dynamic GMM estimator. The following 
section presents briefly two methods to obtain GMM estimator for dynamic models 
which are: difference GMM and system GMM. 
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Greene (2012, p.280) remarks that whether a degree-of-freedom correction improves the small-sample 
properties is an open question.  
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i. Difference GMM Estimation 
Under this methodology, GMM estimators are obtained after first-differencing the 
regression equation where equation (3) is transformed into; 
ΔYit= α ΔYi,t-1+ β ΔXit + Δuit                 where i=1,…,18 and t=3,…,10                          (4) 
As a result of differencing, country’s specific effects are dropped out of the 
model. A potential problem with the model of Equation (4) is the correlation between the 
differenced dependent variable ΔYi,t-1 and the error term Δuit. This problem can be solved 
by using higher-order lags of Yi,t-1 as instruments for ΔYi,t-1.  
In case the explanatory variables Xit are predetermined, i.e. E (Xit uis) ≠ 0 for st 
and zero otherwise, only Xi1, …, Xi(s-1) are used as instruments in the differenced equations 
for period s. whereas if Xit are strictly exogenous then all the X’s are valid instruments for 
all the equations (Arellano and Bond, 1991).  
For the GMM estimator to yield unbiased and consistent estimators requires the 
validity of the following moment conditions: 
E (Yi,t-s Δuit)= E (Xi,t-s Δuit)= 0       s1; t=3,…,10 
ii. System GMM Estimator 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that lagged levels of the 
variables are weak instruments
38
 for first-differences and can induce biases in finite 
samples.  Alternatively, they propose system GMM (Sys-GMM) estimator which can be 
used to solve the weak instruments problem.  
The Sys-GMM estimator adds a system of equations in levels to the first-
differenced equations. Lagged differences of Yit and Xit are used as instruments for 
equation in levels (Equation (3)), whereas lagged levels of Yit and Xit are used as 
instruments for equation in first-differences (Equation (4)). Additional moment 
conditions are required: E (ΔYi,t-1 uit)= E (ΔXi,t-1 uit )= 0               t=3,…,10 
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Weak instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous variables in such a case, the sampling 
distributions of GMM are in general non-normal and standard GMM estimates, hypothesis tests and 
confidence intervals are unreliable.  
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As a result, the study estimates Equation (3) using the Sys-GMM estimator39 with 
robust standard errors
40
; the results are presented in Table (3), column (4). To avoid 
potential endogeneity with real GDP per capita, higher-order lags are used as instruments. 
The rest of the explanatory variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous. Since large 
number of instruments can over fit instrumented variables (Roodman, 2006), only the 
second lags of private sector credit and real GDP per capita are used as instrument in the 
difference equation
41
.  
Specification Tests of Sys-GMM Estimator 
This section tests the consistency of the GMM estimator. First, the Hansen (1982) J-test 
statistic for over-identifying restrictions is used. The test fails to reject the H0 of no over-
identifying restrictions for the GMM estimator (p-value=0.073).  
The second test examines the assumption of no second-order autocorrelation in 
the idiosyncratic error term in first-differences using a test proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The presence of second-order autocorrelation in differences implies the 
presence of first-order autocorrelation in levels (Roodman, 2006). The test fails to reject 
the H0 of no second-order autocorrelation (p-value= 0.993). Therefore, both tests reveal 
that the instrument set used is valid.  
                                                      
39 System GMM estimation has been applied by several studies in examining the determinants of banking 
sector development such as Y. Huang and Temple (2005), Tressel and Detragiache (2008), W. Huang 
(2010), Aggarwal, et al.(2011), Oke, et al. (2011), Voghouei, et al.(2011), and Becerra, et al. (2012). 
40
The resulting standard error estimates are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation within panels. 
41 The rule of thumb is to keep the number of instruments less than or equal to the number of groups (Law 
and Demetriades, 2006; Law and Habibullah, 2009). In addition the study uses collapsed instrument set 
which can avoid the bias that arises as the number of instruments climbs toward the number of observations 
small samples. 
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V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table (3) reports the results of Sys-GMM estimation with robust standard errors (column 
4) excluding the constant term. The lagged dependent variable (PCt-1) is statistically 
significant which emphasizes the dynamic nature of private sector credit. Therefore, 
present values of private sector credit depend on its past values. 
 In accordance with theory, the results reveal that economic growth has a positive 
significant impact on banking sector development. Emerging countries have high growth 
prospects which lead to the burgeoning of investments thereby the demand for credit 
increases. In addition, inflation adversely affects banking sector development. High 
inflation discourages savings due to lower real interest rates. Moreover, investment 
declines since inflation lowers the real return on the invested capital. 
Workers’ remittances positively affect banking sector development which implies 
that remittances recipients may demand financial products to store their excess funds. In 
addition, households that receive their remittances through banks have greater potential to 
learn about and demand other financial products. Also, remittance transfer services allow 
banks to reach out to recipients with no or limited access to financial intermediation 
services. All of the above can enhance the banks’ ability to mobilize savings and extend 
credit to the private sector.    
In terms of institutional and legal characteristics, the results show that the rule of 
law has a significant influence on banking sector development. A legal environment, that 
is capable of enforcing contracts, encourages investors as they feel that their investments 
are protected hence the demand for credit rises. On the other hand, the results show that 
freedom from corruption and property rights protection are not statistically significant 
determinants of banking sector development
42
.  
                                                      
42 Under FGLS estimation, French legal origin dummy is negatively significant at 1% level of significance. 
This result is in line with theory and empirical evidence (La Porta, et al., 2008). French legal origin is 
associated with less judicial independence and heavier government ownership and regulation, higher 
formalism, and weaker investor protection compared to English legal origin hence it has an adverse effect 
on banking sector development. Therefore French legal origin countries should enhance judicial 
independence; lessen procedural formalism and issue laws that ensure the protection of investors.  
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Emerging countries undertook several measures to liberalize the banking sector 
through removing interest rates ceilings; abolishing barriers to entry for private 
ownership of banks; and allowing foreign banks to operate in the domestic market, in 
addition to other measures to liberalize the capital account and remove trade restrictions. 
However the empirical results show that financial liberalization as well as trade openness 
are insignificant in promoting banking sector development. This result implies that the 
emphasis on the importance of liberalization policies should be reassessed while taking 
into consideration the quality of the current institutional infrastructure and the soundness 
of macroeconomic policies.  
Moreover, the results show that market capitalization has a robust impact on 
private sector credit; which implies that the capital market in emerging economies 
complements the banking sector. So the provision of alternative financing options 
through the capital market does not compete with the banking sector. Besides, banks 
themselves can benefit by trading in the capital market.  
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Table (3) Estimation Results: Dependent Variable Ln (Private Sector Credit/GDP) 
Estimation 
Method 
Random 
Effect 
Random Effect with Robust 
Standard Errors 
FGLS Sys-GMM With 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
Ln (PCt-1)    0.652 
(3.8)***  
Ln(RGDPC) 0.073 
(0.65) 
0.073 
(0.47) 
0.139 
(2.3)*** 
0.241 
(2.2)** 
INF -0.013 
(-6.32)*** 
-0.013 
(-4.51)*** 
-0.005 
(-3.69)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.59)*** 
REM 0.005 
(0.46) 
0.005 
(0.55) 
0.012 
(1.68)* 
0.012 
(1.92)* 
LAW 0.032 
(1.69)* 
0.032 
(1.31) 
0.054 
(3.99)*** 
0.035 
(2.15)** 
PRP 0.005 
(2.59)*** 
0.005 
(2.06)** 
0.002 
(1.33) 
0.002 
(0.93) 
FCOR 0.013 
(3.33)*** 
0.013 
(2.15)** 
0.009 
(3.87)*** 
-0.006 
(-1.32) 
FLO -0.373 
(-1.95)* 
-0.373 
(-2.42)*** 
-0.259 
(-3.87)*** 
 
 
CL 0.036 
(1.34) 
0.036 
(0.93) 
-0.012 
 (-0.73) 
-0.039  
(-1.59)  
TO 0.003 
(1.93)* 
0.003 
(1.27) 
0.004 
(5.12)*** 
0.001 
(0.72)  
MCAP 0.002 
(6.33)*** 
0.002 
(3.71)*** 
0.002 
(5.88)*** 
0.002 
(2.98)***  
Observations 180 180 180 261 
R-squared 42.5 42.5   
Wald X
2 153.7 471.1 620.33 738.7 
No. of 
Instruments 
   14 
Hansen Test    5.24 
(0.073) 
m1    -0.19 
(0.85) 
m2    0.01 
(0.993) 
Figures between parentheses are z-statistics except for Hansen test and 1
st
 order (m1) and 2
nd
 order (m2) 
autocorrelation tests which are p-values. ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Finance plays a crucial role in the economy. Well-functioning financial systems allow the 
efficient allocation of capital; diversification of risk; reduction of transaction costs and 
information asymmetry in addition to monitoring investments (Fry, 1995; Levine, 2004; 
Buera, et al., 2009). Hence, financial development becomes a policy priority for 
governments. Nevertheless, many countries remained financially underdeveloped (Law & 
Habibullah, 2009). 
As a result, theories were developed to investigate the reasons behind financial 
development. The models of Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and endogenous growth 
literature emphasize that government intervention in the form of financial repression 
policies is the main source of financial under-development.  On the other hand, Rajan and 
Zingales (2003), in their interest group theory, show that trade and financial openness 
requires the development of financial system to meet the increasing demand of domestic 
producers on credit. Moreover, the determinants of financial development receive great 
attention in the empirical literature however the results provide mixed evidence still. 
Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate the determinants of 
financial development using in a sample of 18 emerging economies. It focuses on the 
development of the banking sector since the literature suggests that it is the main pillar of 
the financial system in most emerging economies (Levine & Zervos, 1998; Levine, 
2002). The study employs private sector credit to proxy banking sector development.  
The study adds to the existing literature by employing a different combination of 
banking sector determinants which are: financial liberalization variables including 
banking sector and capital account liberalization; openness to trade; institutional and 
legal variables including rule of law, freedom from corruption, property rights protection 
and legal origin; and finally, macroeconomic variables including remittances, real GDP 
per capita, and inflation. In addition, the study uses new proxies for banking 
liberalization, property rights protection and freedom from corruption. Moreover, the 
study assesses the relationship between the capital market and the banking sector in 
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emerging economies.  
In this study, the random effect and the feasible generalized least squares 
estimations are employed to analyze the sources of banking sector development. 
However, it is relevant to add a lagged dependent variable to the explanatory variables to 
account for the presence of a dynamic relationship; in addition there is a potential 
endogeneity of economic growth. Hence, the study employs the dynamic GMM estimator 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).      
The findings suggest that, in emerging countries, economic growth and workers’ 
remittances have a positive significant impact on banking sector development while 
inflation affects the latter adversely. On the other hand, financial liberalization and trade 
openness are ineffective in promoting banking sector development. Moreover, the rule of 
law is a robust determinant of banking sector development. Finally, the results provide 
evidence on the complementary relationship between the capital market and the banking 
sector in emerging economies. 
In terms of policy implications, the study suggests that promoting economic growth and 
establishing strong legal systems capable of enforcing contracts and protecting investors’ 
rights enhances banking sector development in emerging economies; and should precede 
financial liberalization and trade openness.  Moreover the development of the banking 
sector should be accompanied with measures to develop and promote the capital market. 
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              APPENDIX (A): EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE DETERMINANTS OF BANKING 
SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
Study Methodology Countries Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 
Data type Time 
Frame 
Main Findings 
Demetriades 
and Luintel 
(1996) 
Unrestricted 
error correction 
model and 
exogeneity tests 
India Real GDP/capita 
Bank deposit 
liabilities/nominal 
GDP 
number of bank 
branches 
 
 
interest rate restrictions, 
reserve and liquidity 
requirements 
directed and 
concessionary lending 
programs 
Investment /capita
43
 
 
Annual 1961-1991 Financial repression in the 
banking sector has a negative 
impact on financial deepening 
except lending rate ceilings 
which has a small positive 
effect. Furthermore financial 
development and economic 
growth are jointly determined. 
Arestis, and 
Demetriades 
(1997) 
Johansen’s 
cointegration 
Germany and 
the USA 
 
Real GDP per capita 
 
Log M2/nominal 
GDP
44
 
Log private 
credit/nominal GDP
45
 
stock market 
capitalization/ 
GDP index of stock 
market volatility 
quarterly 
data 
 
1979 (1)-
1991 (4) 
In the US: real GDP is 
positively contributing to 
banking sector and capital 
market development. 
in Germany: there is a uni- 
directional causality from 
financial development to real 
GDP 
                                                      
43
Included in the marginal process of GDP/capita 
44
This variable is used in the analysis of Germany data 
45
This variable is used in the analysis of the United States data 
43 
 
 
South Korea log bank deposits/ 
nominal GDP 
 
log real GDP per capita 
ex-ante real deposit rate 
of interest 
log of capital stock per 
head 
measure of financial 
repression 
annual 1956-94 Financial repression has a 
positive impact on banking 
sector development and growth 
and the real interest rate has a 
small positive effect. 
La Porta, 
Lopez-de-
Silanes, 
Shleifer and 
Vishny 
(1997) 
Ordinary least 
square (OLS) 
regression 
49 countries 
whose legal 
origins are 
English, 
French, 
German, and 
Scandinavian. 
Equity Market 
development: 
Stock Market 
capitalization held by 
minorities/GNP 
Listed domestic 
firms/population 
Initial public offerings 
of shares/population 
Debt market 
development: 
(bank debt to private 
sector+ face value of 
corporate bonds)/GNP 
legal origin 
GDP growth 
Log GNP 
Rule of Law 
Anti-director rights 
One-share=one-vote 
- - The legal rules protecting 
investors and their enforcement 
have significant effect on the 
size and extent of both equity 
and debt markets. The results 
show that French civil law 
countries have the weakest 
investor protections and the 
least developed financial 
markets. 
Levine (1998) OLS 42 developed 
and developing 
countries 
divided by legal 
origin. 
Credit to the private 
sector/GDP 
 
Creditor rights 
Efficiency of contract 
enforcement 
Legal origin 
Initial log of real 
GDP/capita 
Annual 1976-93 The results show that countries 
with legal system protecting 
creditor rights and enforces 
contracts have better developed 
banking sector. 
44 
 
 
Shan, Morris 
and Sun 
(2001) 
Vector 
autoregression 
(VAR) and 
granger 
causality test 
9 OECD 
countries and 
China 
Private credit/ GDP  
 
Real GDP per capita 
Total factor 
productivity 
(imports+ 
Exports)/GDP 
Total capital 
expenditure/GDP 
CPI 
Index of stock market 
prices 
Annual 1960/70-
1998 
And 
subsample 
from  mid-
1980-1998 
Growth leads to financial 
development in three countries 
There is a bidirectional 
causality in half of the countries 
No evidence that financial 
development leads to growth 
Arestis, 
Demetriades, 
Fattouh and 
Mouratidis 
(2002) 
Conditional 
Parsimonious 
Vector error 
correction 
model 
6 developing 
countries 
(Greece, 
Thailand, 
Philippines, 
Korea, Egypt, 
India) 
Nominal liquid 
liabilities/nominal 
GDP. 
Log real GDP per 
capita 
real interest rate 
interest rate restraints 
reserve and liquidity  
requirement ratios 
Annual 1955 - 
1997 
Real interest rate has a positive, 
significant long-run effect on 
banking sector development 
except South Korea and 
Thailand. 
Financial policies have direct 
significant effects except in 
South Korea, Thailand and 
Greece. The sign of the 
coefficient varies considerably 
across countries; this variation 
may reflect institutional 
differences. 
La Porta, 
Lopez-de-
Silanes, and 
Shleifer 
(2002) 
OLS regression 92 developing 
and developed 
countries 
divided by legal 
origin 
Financial development 
indicators: 
 private credit/GDP 
 liquid 
liabilities/GDP 
 commercial bank 
assets/ total bank 
assets 
Government ownership 
of banks index of 1970 
Initial per capita GDP 
of 1960 
Initial Financial 
development indicator 
of 1960 
- 1960-1995 Initial level of financial 
development is negatively 
correlated with its own 
subsequent growth. 
Government ownership of 
banks reduces subsequent 
financial development. Its 
effect is significant for the 
45 
 
 
 stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
Change of stock 
market 
capitalization/GDP 
Access of firms to 
credit 
Efficiency of the 
banking system 
Instability 
growth of private credit and 
change of stock market 
capitalization ratios to GDP; 
however insignificant for other 
measures. 
 
Svaleryd and 
Vlachos 
(2002) 
OLS regression 
and Granger 
causality test 
80 countries Sachs-Warner (1995) 
index
46
 
Trade openness  
Import duty 
revenue/total imports 
Pre-Uruguay round 
non- tariff trade 
barriers 
private credit/GDP 
liquid liabilities/GDP 
stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
GDP/capita 
Land area 
Distance to 20 major 
trading economies 
Population 
Region (OECD, East 
Asia, Latin America 
and Sub-Saharan 
Africa) 
- 1960-1994 The results show positive, 
significant and bidirectional 
causality between trade 
openness and financial 
development 
Cuadro, 
Gallego and 
García 
Herrero 
(2003) 
OLS 79 countries 
(21 industrial 
and 58 
emerging) 
financial development 
indicator consisting 
of: 
liquid liabilities of 
banks and other 
deposit-taking 
Central bank 
Involvement in 
payments system 
Lender of last resort 
Objectives 
Regulation and 
- - The results show that a 
relatively large involvement of 
the central bank in the financial 
system contributes to financial 
development in all countries. In 
the industrial country group, 
                                                      
46
It is an indicator for the country's openness to trade. The fraction of years between 1950 and 1994 when the country is judged as open is used to construct the index.  
46 
 
 
institutions, 
bank credit to the 
private sector, 
stock market 
capitalization, and 
Bonds outstanding, all 
as a percentage of 
GDP 
the inverse of the 
spread between banks’ 
lending and deposit 
rates, 
the inverse of the net 
interest margin, 
Inverse of banks’ 
overhead costs. 
the turnover of the 
stock exchange and 
the number of listed 
companies 
supervision 
Quality of Regulation 
Supervisory 
Enforcement 
Independence of 
Supervisors 
Control Variables: 
The rule of law 
a creditors’ rights index 
index of economic 
freedom 
deposit insurance 
scheme, 
financial system 
structure 
foreign banks 
participation 
bank concentration, 
financial crisis after 
liberalization 
per capita GDP (PPP) 
gross domestic 
saving/GDP 
inflation 
fiscal deficit/GDP 
exchange rate regime 
both broader central bank 
objectives and lender of last 
resort function are found to be 
beneficial. Moreover, high 
quality regulation and 
supervision is beneficial. For 
emerging countries, the central 
bank involvement in the 
payment system, as well as 
broader central bank objectives 
enhance financial development. 
As for supervisory 
independence, it only 
contributes to financial 
development if a relatively 
solid institutional infrastructure 
is in place. 
47 
 
 
Y. Haung and 
Temple 
(2005) 
OLS 
GMM 
88 countries Overall Financial 
development 
indicator: Liquid 
liabilities/GDP 
Private credit/GDP 
Bank assets/banks and 
central bank assets 
Overhead cost/total 
bank asset 
Net interest margin 
Market 
capitalization/GDP 
Total value 
traded/GDP 
Turnover ratio 
Average  Liquid 
liabilities/GDP and  
Market 
capitalization/GDP 
Financial efficiency 
Extent of bank based 
intermediation 
Equity market 
development 
Financial depth 
Trade openness 
((exports+ 
imports)/GDP) at 
current and 
international prices 
Natural propensity to 
trade 
Log real GDP per 
capita 
legal origin 
annual 1960-1999 Trade openness has significant 
positive impact on financial 
development in lower income 
countries 
W. Huang 
(2006) 
Within-group 
fixed effects 
and first 
differencing,  
First-difference 
GMM 
35 emerging 
countries 
Financial development 
index: 
Private  credit/GDP 
Deposit money bank 
assets/(assets of 
deposit money and 
Financial openness 
index: 
Market capitalization of 
IFC Investible index to 
IFC Global index 
Number of firms in IFC 
luunnA 1976-2003 Financial openness is the key 
determinant of cross-country 
differences in financial 
development.  
Strong evidence that the 
relationship between openness 
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central bank)  
Total bank 
assets/GDP 
Liquid liabilities/GDP 
Market 
capitalization/GDP 
Stock market turnover  
Stock value 
traded/GDP 
Investible index to IFC 
Global index. 
FDI/GDP 
Private capital 
flows/GDP 
Control variables: 
Country risk 
government stability, 
corruption, law and 
order, bureaucracy 
quality, democratic 
accountability, 
exchange rate stability, 
and inflation rate 
trade openness 
and development exists in 
stock markets. The 
relationship between financial 
openness and banking sectors 
is not robust to different 
indicators of financial 
openness. 
Law and 
Demetriades 
(2006) 
GMM 
estimation 
Pooled mean 
group (PMG) 
estimation. 
43 developing 
countries 
 
Log banking sector 
development: 
liquid liabilities/GDP 
private sector 
credit/GDP 
domestic credit 
provided by banking 
sector/GDP 
Log capital market 
development: 
stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
total share value 
traded/GDP 
Number of companies 
listed/total population. 
Log real GDP per 
capita, 
Log institutional quality 
(Political Risk Service 
(PRS) indicators) 
Log capital inflows: 
(private capital inflows; 
and capital account 
liberalization indicator 
constructed by Chinn 
and Ito (2002)) 
Log trade openness: 
(total trade as a ratio of 
GDP and import duties 
as a ratio of total 
imports) 
Annual 1980-2001 The findings show that in 
middle-income countries, trade 
promotes financial 
development; and the effect is 
smaller in low-income 
economies. On the other hand, 
capital inflows have a positive 
effect on financial 
development, especially capital 
market development in middle-
income countries. 
The findings support the 
hypothesis that the combination 
of both financial and trade 
openness exerts an independent 
influence on financial 
49 
 
 
Log interaction term: 
Capital inflows and 
trade openness 
development. 
The findings also suggest that 
institutional quality is a robust 
and significant determinant of 
financial development. The 
findings are robust to 
alternative measures of 
financial and trade openness, as 
well as estimation methods. 
Djankov, 
McLiesh, and 
Shleifer 
(2007) 
OLS regression 129 developed 
and developing 
countries 
Private credit/GDP Credit rights index 
Public registry 
Private bureau 
Information sharing 
Log GDP 
Log GDP per capita 
GDP per capita growth 
Inflation 
Contract enforcement 
days 
Legal origin 
Religion 
- 1978-2003 Legal creditor rights and 
information-sharing institutions 
are statistically significant 
determinants of banking sector 
development. 
Klein and 
Olivei (2008) 
OLS regression 95 countries 
(21 OECD 
countries and 
74 non-OECD 
countries) 
liquid liabilities/GDP 
Private credit/GDP 
capital account 
liberalization indicator 
trade openness 
region 
oil-producing nation 
Annual 1986–1995 
and 1976–
1995 
There is a statistically 
significant effect of open 
capital accounts on banking 
sector development and 
economic growth. However the 
benefits of capital account 
liberalization are only fully 
realized in the presence of 
adequate institutions and sound 
macroeconomic policies. 
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Law (2008) bounds test 
proposed by 
Pesaranet al. 
(2001) 
Malaysia banking sector 
development: 
liquid liabilities/GDP 
private sector 
credit/GDP 
domestic credit 
provided by banking 
sector/GDP 
capital market 
development: 
stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
Number of companies 
listed/total population 
in million. 
real GDP per capita, 
rule of law, 
financial openness, as a 
proxy for capital 
account openness, 
trade openness, 
dummy variable to 
consider the possible 
structural break of the 
1997–1998 East Asian 
financial crisis, 
interaction term 
between financial 
openness and trade 
openness 
annual 1970-2004 Trade openness and capital 
account openness are positively 
significant determinants of 
financial development. 
However, there is no empirical 
support of the hypothesis that 
the simultaneous opening of 
both trade and capital accounts 
is necessary for financial 
development to take place. The 
evidence is valid for different 
measures of financial 
development. 
Tressel and 
Detragiache 
(2008) 
OLS 
System GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
91 developed 
and developing 
countries 
Private sector 
credit/GDP 
 
index of domestic 
banking reforms from 
Abiad, Detragiache and 
Tressel (2008) 
log lagged private 
sector credit/GDP 
Inflation 
GDP per capita 
Fiscal balance/GDP 
Index of securities 
market reforms from  
Abiad, et al. (2008) 
Index of international 
capital flows 
liberalization from  
Abiad, et al. (2008) 
Annual 1973–2005 Reforms have a significant 
positive impact on banking 
sector development, only in 
countries with institutions 
protecting property rights 
51 
 
 
Average tariff level 
Legal origin 
Polity IV index of 
constraints on the 
executive. 
Index of creditors' 
rights protection from 
Djankov, et al. (2007) 
Contract enforcement 
(days) 
Indices of external and 
internal conflicts from 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG)
47
 
Law (2009) GMM 40 developing 
countries 
Banking sector 
development: 
Private sector credit 
Liquid liabilities 
Domestic credit 
Aggregate finance 
development: 
finance-activity: 
(private sector credit 
times the total share 
value traded ratios) 
finance-size: (private 
credit sector times the 
stock market 
capitalization ratios) 
Real GDP per capita 
Trade openness 
Capital flows 
Competition 
(manufacturing value 
added per worker) 
Indicators of 
Institutions: 
Corruption 
Rule of law 
Bureaucratic quality 
Government 
repudiation of contracts 
Risk of expropriation 
Annual 
data  
averaged 
over five-
year period 
1980-2003 The findings reveal that trade 
openness and capital flows are 
significant determinants of 
banking sector development. In 
addition the simultaneous 
opening of both the trade and 
capital accounts also appears to 
have positive impacts on 
banking sector development. 
The evidence also suggests that 
openness leads to higher 
financial development through 
institutional quality and 
competition channels. 
 
                                                      
47
It is a monthly publication of Political Risk Services (PRS). 
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Law and 
Habibullah 
(2009) 
GMM and the 
pooled mean 
group (PMG) 
estimator 
27 developed 
and developing 
economies 
divided into 
two groups (the 
G-7, Europe, 
East Asia and 
Latin America) 
Private sector credit / 
GDP 
Stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
Log real GDP per 
capita 
Log institutional quality 
indicators 
Log trade openness 
(total trade/GDP) 
Financial liberalization 
indices from Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2003) 
Annual 1980-2001 Real GDP per capita and 
institutions are significant 
determinants of banking sector 
and capital market development 
Trade openness is more 
prominent in promoting capital 
market development 
Financial liberalization 
programs are more responsive 
in developed economies. 
Assane and 
Malamud 
(2010) 
OLS 36 Sub-Saharan 
African 
countries 
divided into: 12 
English legal 
origin 
countries, 12 
French legal 
origin countries 
members in the 
CFA currency 
union, and 12 
French legal 
origin not CFA 
members. 
Log quasi-liquid 
liabilities(time 
deposits)/GDP 
Log liquid 
liabilities(M2)/GDP 
Log credit to the 
private sector/GDP 
Log deposit bank 
assets/ sum of deposit 
bank and central bank 
assets 
financial retardation: 
Currency/GDP 
Log Per capita income 
French legal origin, 
member in CFA 
French legal origin, not 
CFA member 
Inflation over 5 year 
period 
 
Annual 1965-2000 Financial development in 
English legal origin countries is 
higher than French legal origin 
countries in Sub-Saharan 
Countries. 
Currency union membership 
tends to hinder financial 
development. 
Financial development 
contributes positively to 
growth in English legal origin 
countries while it contributes 
negatively or insignificantly to 
growth in French legal origin 
countries. 
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Y. Haung 
(2010) 
bias-corrected 
Least Square 
Dummy 
Variables 
(LSDV) and 
GMM 
estimations 
90 non-
transition 
economies 
liquid liabilities/GDP 
Private credit/GDP 
Commercial bank 
assets/ sum of 
commercial bank and 
central bank assets. 
The institutional 
improvement index 
Log real GDP per 
capita 
Trade openness 
Aggregate investment 
Black market premium 
annual 1960-99 There is a positive effect of 
political institutional 
improvement on banking sector 
development at least in the 
short-run, particularly for lower 
income countries. 
Sharma and 
Nguyen 
(2010) 
OLS Figi (in 
comparison 
with 
40 developed 
and developing 
countries) 
composite index for 
banking development: 
the ratio of bank 
assets to GDP, the 
ratio of bank private 
sector credit to GDP, 
the ratio of bank, 
liquid liabilities to 
GDP 
Strength of the relevant 
legal rules indicators 
(La Porta, et al., 
1998a). 
Quality of law 
enforcement indicators: 
efficiency of the 
judicial system, rule of 
law, corruption, risk of 
expropriation and the 
quality of accounting 
standards 
Annual 1970-2006 The results emphasized a direct 
relationship between law 
enforcement quality and 
banking development, however 
they suggest that the legal rules 
codifying creditor rights may 
not be as influential as had 
been thought previously. 
Fiji’s banking sector appears to 
have developed relatively well 
despite very weak legal rules 
and average law enforcement 
quality. 
Yu and Gan 
(2010) 
OLS Malaysia liquid liability, 
private sector credit 
domestic credit 
Real GDP 
real interest rates 
financial liberalization 
index constructed by 
Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2003) 
trade openness= total 
trade/GDP 
Quarterly 
data 
1980-2007 First, the higher the growth of 
GDP, the better the Malaysian 
banking sector development. 
Second, financial liberalization 
has negative impact on banking 
sector development suggesting 
that financial liberalization 
should come in a later stage, 
when adequate institutions and 
sound macroeconomic policies 
are already in place. 
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Finally the real interest rates 
and trade openness are not 
statistically significant 
determinants of the banking 
sector development. 
Abzari, Zarei 
and Esfahani 
(2011) 
VAR 
and Granger 
causality test 
8 developing 
countries of D-
8 group (Iran, 
turkey, 
Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
Egypt, Nigeria) 
Log Liquid liability to 
GDP. 
Log Domestic credit 
provided by the 
banking sector to 
GDP. 
Log Domestic credit 
provided by financial 
intermediaries to 
private sector GDP. 
Log net inflow of 
investment/GDP 
Log GDP 
Annual 1976-2005 Existence of causality link from 
FDI to banking sector 
development with exception to 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Egypt 
at 5 percent level of 
significance. 
Aggarwal, 
Demirgüç-
Kunt, Pería 
(2011) 
Fixed effects 
estimation 
GMM 
estimation 
IV estimation 
109 developing 
countries 
Bank Deposits/GDP 
Bank Credit to private 
sector/ GDP. 
Remittances to GDP 
GDP per capita 
Log of GDP 
Inflation 
Dual exchange rate 
Exports to GDP 
FDI inflows to GDP 
Aid flows to GDP 
Portfolio inflows to 
GDP 
Annual 1975–2007 There is a positive and 
significant impact of 
remittances on banking sector 
development in developing 
countries, irrespective of the 
different control variables, 
estimation techniques used and 
different measures of banking 
sector development. 
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Chowdhury 
(2011) 
Johansen  
Maximum 
Likelihood  
cointegration 
Vector Error 
Correction 
Model (VECM) 
Bangladesh Credit/GDP 
Deposit/GDP 
M2/GDP 
remittance 
GDP per capita 
Log of GDP 
CPI 
Interest rates used 
alternatively (cash rate, 
deposit rate  and 
lending rate) 
Trade openness 
Openness in capital 
account (the flow of 
FDI plus net official 
development assistance 
(ODA)/GDP) 
Annual 1971-2008 The results suggest that 
remittances have a significant 
positive effect on banking 
sector development. However, 
banking sector development is 
neutral in its effect on the 
inflow of remittances. 
Erosy (2011) Bounds test for 
cointegration 
within the 
ARDL 
(Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag) 
approach. 
Granger 
Causality test 
under VECM 
Turkey Liquid liabilities 
(M2)/GDP 
Financial openness: 
(FDI net inflows+ FDI 
net outflows+ net 
portfolio 
investment)/GDP 
Real GDP 
Output volatility: the 5 
year rolling standard 
deviation of real GDP 
growth rate 
 
Annual 1980-2008 Results of the bounds test 
reveal that financial openness 
is in a long run equilibrium 
relationship with banking 
sector development, growth 
and output volatility in Turkey. 
Granger causality tests, on the 
other hand, show a 
unidirectional causality running 
from banking sector 
development to financial 
openness in the long run and 
from financial openness to 
output volatility in the short 
run. 
Yet, no Granger causality is 
detected neither from financial 
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openness to growth nor from 
financial openness to banking 
sector development in Turkey. 
Oke, Uadiale 
and Okpala 
(2011) 
ordinary least 
square (OLS) 
and GMM 
Nigeria M2/GDP 
Private credit/GDP 
remittances, 
GDP, 
Inflation rate 
trade openness, 
the dummy for dual 
exchange rates regimes, 
the dummy 
representing Financial 
Liberalization, 
one lag value of 
remittances 
Annual 1977-2009 The results indicate remittances 
positively and significantly 
influence banking sector 
development in Nigeria, with 
the exception of the private 
credit ratio in the GMM 
estimation where the coefficient 
is insignificant. This implies 
that remittances raise liquid 
liabilities more than loanable 
funds in Nigeria, as remittances 
are likely used for consumption 
more than for productive 
purposes. 
Voghouei, 
Azali and 
Law (2011) 
System GMM 60 low-, 
middle-, and 
high-income 
countries 
Index for banking 
sector development: 
Liquid liabilities 
Private sector credit 
Commercial banks 
assets/(commercial 
banks assets+ central 
bank assets) 
Index for capital 
market development: 
stock market 
capitalization 
total value traded 
Political institutions: 
Executive recruitment 
Executive constraint 
Political competition 
Political checks and 
balances 
Freedom of press 
Distribution of 
resources: 
Gini coefficient 
Economic institutions: 
Corruption 
Bureaucratic quality 
Annual 1980-2006 The results reveal that political 
power is a statistically 
significant determinant of 
economic institutions and hence 
affects the development of 
financial systems. 
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turnover ratio Government 
repudiation of contracts 
Risk of expropriation 
Rule of law 
Control variables: 
Trade openness 
Capital account 
openness 
Legal origin 
Inflation rate 
GDP per capita (PPP) 
Latitude 
Tropic 
Land lock 
Ethnic 
Religion 
language 
Becerra, 
Cavallo, and 
Scartascini 
(2012) 
OLS, IV 
regressions and 
System GMM 
97 countries 
(27 developed 
and 70 
developing) 
Domestic credit to 
private sector (% of 
GDP) 
Stock market 
capitalization 
Liquid liabilities 
interest groups’ 
incentive to block 
financial development 
proxied by: 
credit dependence 
Strength of promoters 
bureaucratic quality 
index of corruption 
index of government 
stability, 
Index of the quality of 
institutions (the sum of 
the corruption, law and 
order, and bureaucratic 
Annual 1965-2003 The results suggest that lower 
opposition to financial 
development leads to enhancing 
credit markets development 
only in those countries that 
have high government 
capabilities. On the other hand, 
improvements in government 
capabilities have a significant 
impact on credit market 
development only in those 
countries where credit 
dependency is high (i.e. lower 
opposition). 
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quality indexes) 
log real GDP per capita 
in PPP, as proxy of the 
level of 
industrialization 
trade openness 
financial openness= 
volume  of foreign 
assets and liabilities (% 
of GDP) 
legal origin 
 
Obamuyi and 
Demehin 
(2012) 
Cointegration 
and vector error 
correction 
models 
(VECM) 
Nigeria Broad money (M2)/ 
GDP 
deposit rates  
inflation rate, 
lagged value of 
financial 
depth(M2/GDPt-1), 
GDP growth rate 
domestic savings/GDP 
exchange rate, 
liquidity reserve ratio, 
Shift in financial policy 
from regulation to 
deregulation of interest. 
Annual 1973 - 
2009 
Interest rate reform has a 
positive and significant effect 
on banking sector development 
in Nigeria. 
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APPENDIX (B): DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
]Variable Description Unit of measurement Source 
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Private sector 
credit  
Claims on the private sector by 
deposit money banks divided 
by GDP. 
Percentage of GDP Beck and 
Demirgüç-
Kunt (2009) 
n
kn
g
n
ok
g
p 
e
ki
re
g
pk
cg
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c
n
 
Banking 
Liberalization  
It is proxied by Credit Market 
Regulation index. This index 
focuses on regulatory restraints 
on Credit markets. The first two 
sub-components; ownership of 
banks and competition in 
domestic banking, provide 
evidence on the extent to which 
the banking industry is 
dominated by private banks and 
whether foreign banks are 
permitted to compete in the 
market. The last sub-component 
shows the presence of controls 
on interest rates. 
The index ranges from 
0-10. Higher values 
indicate higher level of 
banking sector 
liberalization  
Gwartney, 
Lawson and 
Hall (2011) 
Capital 
account 
openness 
index  
This index measures a country's 
degree of capital account 
openness. It is a de-jure 
measure that attempts to 
measure the intensity of capital 
controls. It is based on the IMF 
measure of Exchange 
Restrictions. 
Higher values indicate 
the more open the 
country is to cross-
border capital 
transactions.  
Chinn and Ito 
(2008) 
t
g
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kt
g
p 
v
g
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rt
 t
re
rp
c
l
e
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Stock market 
Capitalization 
of listed 
companies 
It is the share price times the 
number of shares outstanding. 
Listed domestic companies are 
the domestically incorporated 
companies listed on the 
country's stock exchanges at the 
end of the year. Listed 
companies do not include 
investment companies, mutual 
funds, or other collective 
investment vehicle. 
Percentage of GDP Beck and 
Demirgüç-
Kunt (2009) 
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Variable Description Unit of measurement Source 
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wnA  o  AnR It is proxied by the integrity of 
the legal system index which 
is based on the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICGR) 
data for Law and Order. The 
‘law’ sub-component assesses 
the strength and impartiality 
of the legal system, and the 
‘order’ sub-component 
assesses popular observance 
of the law.  
The index ranges from 0-
10 where better 
institutional quality 
receives higher scores.   
Gwartney, 
Lawson and 
Hall (2011)  
Property 
Rights 
Protection 
Index 
It is Heritage Foundation 
Property rights index which 
measures the degree to which 
a country’s laws protect 
private property rights and the 
degree of their enforcement. It 
also assesses the likelihood 
that private property will be 
expropriated and analyzes the 
independence of the judiciary, 
the existence of corruption 
within the judiciary, and the 
ability of individuals and 
businesses to enforce 
contracts.  
This index ranges from 0 
to 100 where higher 
values are given to 
countries that protect 
property rights more 
effectively.   
Heritage 
Foundation 
Freedom 
from 
corruption  
It is the Heritage Foundation 
Freedom from Corruption 
Index.  The score for this 
index is derived primarily 
from Transparency 
International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) for 
2010, which measures the 
level of corruption in 178 
countries.  
The score of the Freedom 
from corruption Index 
ranges from 0 to 100 
where 100 indicates very 
little corruption while 0 
indicates a very corrupt 
government.  
 
Heritage 
Foundation 
French Legal 
Origin  
It dummy variable for the 
French legal origin countries.  
It takes the value of 1 in 
case of French legal 
origin countries and 0 
otherwise. 
La Porta, et al. 
(1998b) 
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Variable Description Unit of measurement Source 
Trade openness The sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of GDP. 
Percentage of GDP World 
Development 
Indicators 
v
g
oe
c
ro
c
n
c
e
ko
 n
g
ek
g
i
pr
M
 
 
Workers’ 
remittances, 
compensation 
of 
employees, 
and migrants' 
transfers, 
received 
Remittances are classified as 
current private transfers from 
migrant workers resident in 
the host country for more than 
a year, irrespective of their 
immigration status, to 
recipients in their country of 
origin. Migrants' transfers are 
defined as the net worth of 
migrants who are expected to 
remain in the host country for 
more than one year that is 
transferred from one country 
to another at the time of 
migration. Compensation of 
employees is the income of 
migrants who have lived in 
the host country for less than a 
year. 
Percentage of GDP World 
Development 
Indicators 
Real GDP 
per capital 
Gross domestic product 
divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all 
resident producers in the 
economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies 
not included in the value of 
the products.  
2000 constant prices in 
USD 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Inflation, 
GDP deflator 
(% annual) 
Inflation as measured by the 
annual growth rate of the 
GDP implicit deflator shows 
the rate of price change in the 
economy as a whole. 
Annual percentage 
change 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
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APPENDIX (C): BANKING SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS 
 BRL CHL ECU EGY IND IDN JOR MYL MEX MAR PAK PER PHL RUS ZAF THA TUN TUR Avg. HIC MIC 
1.Depth                        
1.1 M2 to GDP (%)                   
2000 47.3 96.9 23.8 76.7 53.9 53.9 112.5 122.7 27.3 74.4 38.6 32.2 57.7 21.5 54.1 114.5 50.1 34.5 60.7 116.9 64.4 
2004 50.7 78.8 23.7 96.6 63.5 45.0 126.2 131.7 27.0 80.0 48.4 26.7 56.3 31.1 64.3 114.7 52.0 34.6 64.0 115.3 73.0 
2008 64.1 77.3 28.2 88.4 75.8 38.3 122.1 124.0 26.7 107.9 45.2 34.2 59.4 39.4 84.6 109.1 58.4 48.6 68.4 132.1 79.3 
2009 69.4 71.4 32.4 83.1 78.0 38.2 139.9 145.9 30.4 107.5 41.8 34.1 62.1 49.2 81.2 117.0 61.8 54.6 72.1 140.6 95.9 
Average 
55.2 81.7 25.1 90.4 65.5 44.9 125.9 132.2 27.9 89.1 45.1 30.6 58.6 33.5 69.5 113.0 54.1 42.0 65.8 120.5 75.7 
1.2 Central bank assets to GDP (%)               
2000 10.7 10.68 11.20 25.18 7.59 17.26 11.87 0.59 .. 5.78 14.63 0.26 5.51 7.49 1.17 2.13 0.36 0.73 7.83 1.2 4.9 
2004 15.5 6.38 3.70 44.52 2.20 11.67 7.77 0.03 .. 3.64 4.29 0.06 1.99 1.94 2.64 1.78 0.16 4.60 6.64 1.1 3.7 
2008 14.2 0.97 1.16 19.41 1.80 5.78 5.98 0.34 .. 1.60 9.83 .. 3.70 0.89 0.52 2.79 0.14 1.64 4.42 1.1 2.2 
2009 17.9 0.97 0.08 14.52 1.97 5.01 6.78 0.38 .. 1.06 10.81 .. 3.44 0.96 0.46 3.17 0.12 1.30 4.31 1.6 2.9 
Average 14.2 5.8 4.1 29.9 3.5 11.1 8.4 0.3 .. 3.2 8.5 0.2 3.1 2.5 1.5 2.1 0.3 3.9 6.2 1.1 3.5 
1.3 Deposit money bank assets to GDP (%)                
2000 62.9 60.6 38.2 74.3 41.1 43.7 86.4 131.0 32.6 63.7 30.2 28.9 47.2 18.5 70.6 131.6 52.4 32.6 58.1 83.0 31.7 
2004 61.6 61.8 19.8 82.4 52.1 37.1 85.7 116.8 24.8 62.4 36.3 21.1 44.7 25.5 68.5 113.4 57.8 35.7 56.0 100.0 29.7 
2008 77.9 78.4 23.8 69.6 63.0 30.8 101.8 105.0 30.3 79.3 40.0 23.3 38.2 39.2 85.4 104.1 58.3 49.6 61.0 111.3 38.1 
2009 83.3 83.4 27.2 68.7 62.7 30.5 97.0 126.5 34.0 84.7 36.5 26.0 43.4 49.6 87.7 108.0 60.8 58.8 64.9 125.3 42.7 
Average 67.8 67.0 25.0 76.2 53.1 36.5 93.5 120.0 28.9 68.4 35.2 23.7 43.0 29.2 75.0 112.3 57.7 41.3 58.5 102.1 33.1 
1.4 Deposits to GDP (%)                 
2000 40.5 48.7 18.4 61.1 42.6 44.7 85.6 107.6 24.6 56.4 26.5 26.1 50.4 12.5 50.1 103.3 43.8 28.3 48.4 63.6 26.5 
2004 43.9 44.0 19.9 79.2 50.6 38.6 99.6 112.0 20.2 64.0 33.4 21.2 46.9 19.1 51.4 100.4 46.4 29.4 51.1 68.6 29.6 
2008 60.7 52.1 25.8 76.4 63.2 33.7 108.1 109.4 21.9 85.2 35.3 24.3 45.8 30.9 63.4 84.1 50.9 39.8 56.2 78.4 35.7 
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2009 66.4 55.2 27.9 75.4 69.5 33.2 109.2 109.1 22.7 93.5 35.7 25.9 45.3 35.6 67.2 79.0 52.0 42.1 58.1 
89.7 43.7 
Average 
49.1 48.6 21.7 74.0 53.3 38.1 99.7 112.2 21.9 69.9 32.4 23.7 47.8 22.0 55.5 95.8 47.9 34.3 52.7 74.1 31.6 
2.Access                       
2.1 Loan accounts per 1,000 adults (commercial banks)             
2000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2004 .. 573.6 .. .. 88.2 117.1 150.3 457.4 220.8 .. 39.1 109.3 .. .. .. 178.0 .. .. 214.9 .. .. 
2008 .. 829.0 .. .. 130.9 173.6 162.7 686.2 395.6 .. 48.8 237.7 .. .. .. 257.9 .. .. 324.7 .. .. 
2009 514 843.4 .. .. 132.0 189.3 207.9 640.6 326.1 .. 38.8 195.5 .. .. .. 263.5 .. .. 335.1 .. .. 
Average 514 730.6 .. .. 114.1 150.7 167.7 621.5 341.1 .. 45.2 168.9 .. .. .. 228.8 
 
.. .. 291.6 .. .. 
2.2 Deposit accounts per 1,000 adults (commercial banks)              
2000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2004 681 1410 .. .. 607.6 481.1 795.8 1780.8 507.7 320.7 156.8 729.6 357.9 .. 383.8 1113.3 .. .. 717.4 474.2 9.8 
2008 890 1904 .. 386.1 711.6 464.7 918.7 1632.3 996.5 411.1 230.7 681.7 408.9 .. 780.5 1402.2 .. 1763.2 905.5 1094 345 
2009 933 2007 .. 376.4 794.4 485.3 934.4 1576.5 1047.9 659.3 226.2 704.8 424.3 .. 887.7 1401.6 .. 1649.2 940.5 1257 557 
Average 794 1687 .. 378.1 664.5 471.2 872.6 1772.5 717.8 402.0 201.8 600.4 391.1 .. 663.0 1300.9 .. 1727.7 840.2 885.4 277 
2.3 Household deposit accounts per 1,000 adults (commercial banks)               
2000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2004 .. 1372 .. .. 584.4 471.7 .. .. .. 290.8 58.0 .. .. .. .. 1072.4 .. .. 641.5 .. .. 
2008 .. 1851 .. 376.9 660.5 450.8 .. .. .. 377.8 95.7 .. .. .. .. 1350.2 .. 1624.6 848.5 .. .. 
2009 .. 1960 .. 367.5 723.0 469.0 .. .. .. 620.3 99.1 .. .. .. .. 1347.4 .. 1517.4 888.0 .. .. 
Average .. 1641 .. 369.0 618.1 459.0 .. .. .. 370.7 77.4 .. .. .. .. 1252.6 .. 1593.2 792.2 .. .. 
2.4 Bank branches per 100,000 adults (commercial banks)              
2000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 46.5 .. 
2004 .. 12.5 .. 3.8 9.0 5.1 18.8 13.3 10.9 9.9 7.4 4.3 8.3 26.7 4.8 7.7 12.0 14.2 10.5 46.5 4.1 
2008 43.1 15.4 .. 4.5 9.3 6.5 18.9 10.6 13.4 14.2 8.2 28.2 7.7 35.8 7.9 10.2 14.5 16.9 15.6 30.6 7.9 
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2009 43.9 16.9 .. 4.6 9.6 7.5 19.1 10.4 14.1 19.6 8.3 33.1 7.7 35.0 9.4 10.7 15.0 17.1 16.6 32.4 10.1 
Average 42.6 14.3 .. 4.2 9.2 5.9 18.6 11.3 12.2 13.0 7.8 17.0 7.9 31.7 7.1 9.2 12.9 15.0 12.8 32.6 7.2 
2.5 Automated teller machines (ATMs) (per 100,000 adults)              
2000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2004 105 33.3 .. 2.7 .. 8.4 .. 27.2 28.4 8.3 0.7 10.7 10.4 16.2 29.9 19.8 8.5 28.3 22.5 68.6 10.1 
2008 112 54.7 .. 6.5 4.3 12.9 25.6 42.3 41.2 16.3 3.4 20.3 13.4 65.6 44.1 64.8 15.6 42.5 34.4 69.2 24.1 
2009 115 57.6 .. 7.7 5.2 13.9 27.3 53.1 42.8 18.3 3.9 22.2 14.4 76.6 52.6 72.6 17.9 45.5 38.1 78.0 29 
Average 110 46.1 .. 3.5 .. 11.3 .. 33.6 41.7 .. 2.3 15.6 12.2 43.2 34.9 46.5 12.8 34.8 32.7 79.1 17.9 
2.6 Outstanding deposits with commercial banks (% of GDP)              
2000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2004 29.2 34.3 ..  46.6 42.0 142.9 111.8 19.1 64.5 36.0 19.6 26.0 16.1 37.9 87.6 45.5 34.2 49.6 .. .. 
2008 46.9 37.8 .. 83.4 58.2 35.4 112.4 106.0 19.7 83.1 33.3 26.2 38.6 26.3 46.6 78.3 52.4 45.8 54.7 .. .. 
2009 46.3 38.0 .. 77.7 59.9 35.2 113.9 125.2 20.7 85.4 30.7 25.9 41.6 33.4 44.7 78.4 55.4 51.2 56.7 .. .. 
Average 39.5 35.0 .. 85.1 52.1 38.3 129.1 116.6 18.7 77.0 35.1 22.4 31.3 23.8 43.1 82.0 49.7 41.4 53.5 .. .. 
2.7 Outstanding loans with commercial banks (% of GDP)              
2000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2004 19.0 60.7 .. .. 27.2 24.4 74.2 92.0 12.6 49.0 26.1 15.0 23.8 26.2 57.1 83.7 53.8 16.8 41.3 .. .. 
2008 29.9 78.8 .. 44.8 43.3 26.4 80.2 82.8 15.5 75.4 29.4 24.1 16.5 48.2 78.5 81.4 55.0 35.6 49.7 .. .. 
2009 31.6 76.4 .. 41.3 43.5 25.7 74.1 94.9 16.5 77.5 23.4 23.4 16.3 51.2 75.3 85.1 57.3 37.3 50.0 .. .. 
Average 26.8 67.2 .. 46.5 36.6 25.1 81.4 92.0 14.2 63.3 27.5 19.1 19.4 38.8 70.1 80.3 54.3 28.3 47.1 .. .. 
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3. Efficiency                   
3.1 profitability                     
3.1.1 Return on Asset (%)                  
2000 1.0 1.4 -11.8 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 8.0 1.7 -0.1 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.0 
2004 1.7 1.5 -2.6 0.5 1.2 2.3 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.3 0.8 1.5 0.9 1.3 0.5 3.2 1.1 1.0 1.3 
2008 0.9 0.5 1.7 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.2 0.6 1.1 0.8 2.3 0.6 1.6 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.7 1.2 0.6 1.6 
2009 1.2 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.0 1.7 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.8 2.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 2.4 1.2 0.6 1.1 
Average 1.6 1.3 -1.7 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.5 0.8 2.2 1.3 0.8 0.7 1.9 1.0 0.8 1.3 
3.1.2 Return on equity (%)                   
2000 9.0 15.6 67.7 13.0 13.8 3.5 10.5 11.0 11.1 10.7 5.4 3.4 1.1 54.1 15.7 -1.9 11.4 1.7 14.3 12.13 11.4 
2004 15.4 16.8 11.6 7.8 21.3 23.2 9.5 16.6 9.8 9.2 16 11.6 7.1 8.7 16 15.8 5.0 20 13.4 1 13.4 
2008 8.2 7.1 -43.7 11.4 14.0 12.2 10.4 15.7 6.2 14.0 7.9 27.6 7.0 11.8 20.9 10.0 11.4 16.9 9.4 11.08 15.3 
2009 9.8 6.3 12.2 10.8 14.5 16.4 7.1 10.0 5.5 14.2 7.5 21.8 11.3 8.8 13.5 9.7 11.6 20.4 11.7 7.86 12.3 
Average 14.4 15.0 5.7 9.6 15.3 14.6 9.9 13.1 8.4 10.7 11.9 15.6 6.9 15.0 15.6 9.8 7.4 0.0 11.1 12.38 13.3 
3.1.3 Net interest margin (%)                
2000 5.5 0.1 1.5 1.7 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.3 5.9 0.04 5.4 4.5 1.2 0.4 3.3 1.8 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.08 3.29 
2004 4.6 0.1 1.8 1.7 3.3 5.7 1.7 3.2 5.7 0.04 2.9 4.0 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.6 1.8 2.7 1.72 3.21 
2008 1.9 0.0 5.8 2.0 2.7 5.4 2.9 3.1 5.3 0.03 6.5 4.1 2.3 3.3 3.2 2.8 3.1 4.3 3.3 1.79 4.02 
2009 2.2 0.0 5.4 2.3 3.0 5.6 2.6 3.1 5.2 0.03 7.3 5.4 2.5 3.5 3.0 2.4 2.6 4.8 3.4 1.72 3.56 
Average 4.4 0.1 4.3 1.7 3.3 4.8 2.3 3.1 5.8 0.04 5.2 4.4 2.0 2.7 3.6 2.5 2.8 3.3 3.1 1.81 3.47 
3.2 Efficiency                    
3.2.1 Lending-deposit spread (%)                 
2000 39.6 5.6 8.3 3.8 .. 6.0 4.8 4.3 8.7 8.2  20.2 2.6 17.9 5.3 4.5 .. .. 10.0 8.29 4.16 
2004 39.5 3.2 5.8 5.7 .. 7.7 5.8 3.0 4.7 7.9 5.6 22.3 3.9 7.7 4.7 4.5 .. .. 8.8 6.66 3.82 
2008 35.6 5.8 .. 5.7 .. 5.1 3.6 3.0 5.7 .. 6.0 20.2 4.3 6.5 3.5 4.6 .. .. 8.4 6.44 3.21 
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2009 35.4 5.2 .. 5.5 .. 5.2 4.3 3.0 5.1 .. 5.9 18.2 5.8 6.7 3.2 4.9 .. .. 8.3 6.54 4.35 
Average 38.6 4.2 7.6 5.3 .. 5.3 4.7 3.3 5.4 8.3 6.2 19.7 4.3 8.9 4.4 4.4 .. .. 8.8 7.31 3.96 
3.2.2 Overhead costs to total assets (%)                  
2000 6.3 2.9 7.9 1.6 2.4 2.7 1.8 1.42 4.9 2.4 3.3 5.3 3.1 6.4 3.0 2.0 2.4 4.6 3.6 1.62 4.43 
2004 5.6 2.7 6.7 1.4 2.2 3.3 1.8 1.42 4.4 2.0 2.2 5.1 2.9 4.1 3.0 1.7 2.5 5.0 3.2 1.40 4.07 
2008 3.2 .. 5.8 1.4 1.8 3.3 1.7 1.36 3.5 2.1 2.8 3.7 2.9 6.1 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.9 2.9 1.34 3.43 
2009 4.0 .. 5.5 1.4 1.7 3.3 1.7 1.39 3.8 1.8 2.7 4.1 2.9  2.7 2.1 2.0 2.6 2.7 1.33 3.60 
Average 4.9 2.7 6.6 1.4 2.1 3.1 1.8 1.40 4.9 2.1 2.6 4.6 3.1 4.8 2.9 2.0 2.3 4.0 3.2 1.42 3.88 
3.3 Competitiveness                    
3.3.1. 3-bank asset concentration (%)                  
2000 29.8 38.4 51.9 51.7 34.2 62.7 78.3 43.1 57.2 46.6 64.1 61.9 100.0 41.0 75.0 49.6 43.2 76.3 55.8 63.04 67.9 
2004 37.9 53.5 48.5 51.1 32.8 46.6 81.8 34.6 58.3 58.7 47.7 72.5 70.0 20.5 96.9 46.6 44.4 89.9 55.1 67.90 61.1 
2008 49.9 .. 53.0 50.6 31.8 43.2 77.1 37.7 79.5 64.8 39.6 76.6 44.2 38.8 72.4 41.1 42.4 43.6 52.1 65.25 59.7 
2009 58.6 .. 54.3 50.2 31.8 44.3 71.7 37.6 74.1 71.7 39.7 74.1 43.2 42.9 72.5 41.8 39.9 46.2 52.6 63.77 58.6 
Average 40.0 50.2 50.2 51.2 33.4 50.3 79.1 37.0 65.1 58.5 49.0 72.6 63.8 41.9 81.7 45.8 42.8 71.9 54.7 64.82 62.3 
3.3.2 Percentage of foreign bank assets among total bank assets (%)              
2000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2004 19.0 .. 12.0 10.0 4.0 30.0 2.0 18.0 82.0 .. 29.0 41.0 .. .. .. 3.0 20.0 .. 22.5 14 31.0 
2008 22.0 37.0 13.0 25.0 5.0 31.0 22.0 18.0 76.0 18.0 51.0 50.0 .. 13.0 21.0 7.0 28.0 16.0 26.6 16 35.0 
2009 .. 34.0 5.0 23.0 5.0 32.0 23.0 18.0 75.0 34.0 53.0 50.0 .. 12.0 22.0 6.0 .. 14.0 27.1 17 31.5 
Average 23.4 35.5 11.0 19.3 4.3 30.8 15.7 17.8 79.3 23.7 42.3 47.7 1.5 10.6 21.8 4.3 26.2 16.5 15.3 15.9 31.7 
3.3.3 Percentage of foreign banks among total banks (%)               
2000 35.0 52.0 23.0 16.0 8.0 33.0 10.0 26.0 49.0 38.0 19.0 59.0 17.0 9.0 14.0 12.0 38.0 15.0 26.3 22 30.0 
2004 36.0 39.0 15.0 19.0 9.0 33.0 20.0 30.0 54.0 44.0 12.0 60.0 14.0 14.0 17.0 17.0 44.0 20.0 27.6 28 36.0 
2008 37.0 48.0 15.0 52.0 12.0 50.0 40.0 33.0 48.0 40.0 40.0 63.0 15.0 19.0 22.0 19.0 50.0 43.0 35.9 32 43.0 
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2009 38.0 48.0 19.0 52.0 12.0 52.0 40.0 33.0 48.0 50.0 40.0 63.0 13.0 19.0 22.0 19.0 50.0 43.0 36.7 33 44.5 
Average 36.3 44.2 15.7 40.5 11.0 42.7 31.7 31.8 48.8 42.3 29.2 61.0 14.2 16.7 21.2 16.5 49.0 35.2 32.7 31.50 37.3 
3.3.4 Boone Indicator                   
2000 -0.08 -0.08 -0.51 -0.07 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.31 -0.07 -0.20 -0.06 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 
2004 -0.09 -0.06 -1.45 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.19 -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 0.02 -0.01 -0.14 -0.05 -0.05 
2008 -0.05 -0.01 -1.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.02 -0.18 -0.08 -0.15 -0.07 -0.10 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.03 -0.06 
2009 -0.06 0.02 -1.53 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.14 -0.07 -0.14 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.14 -0.04 -0.05 
Average -0.09 -0.05 -1.65 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.20 -0.06 -0.19 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.16 -0.05 -0.06 
4. Stability:                    
4.1 capital adequacy                   
4.1.1 Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%)                 
2000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2004 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2008 18 12.5 19.9 14.7 13.0 16.8 18.4 15.5 15.3 11.2 12.2 11.9 15.5 16.8 13.0 13.9 11.7 18 14.9 12.4 15.2 
2009 19 14.3 19.6 15.1 13.2 17.4 19.6 18.2 16.5 11.7 14.0 13.5 15.8 20.9 14.1 15.8 12.4 21 16.2 14.6 16.4 
Average 19 12.9 19.6 14.6 12.7 18.8 19.6 15.3 15.6 11.5 13 12.3 16.5 16.8 13 14.3 12.0 21 15.3 13 16 
4.2 Asset quality                   
4.2.1 Bank non-performing loans to gross loans (%)                
2000 8.3 1.7 31.0 13.6 12.8 34.4 18.4 15.4 5.8 17.5 19.5 .. 24.0 7.7 .. 17.7 21.6 9.2 16.2 4.1 11.3 
2004 2.9 1.2 6.4 23.6 7.2 4.5 10.3 11.7 2.5 19.4 11.6 9.5 14.4 3.8 1.8 11.9 23.6 6.0 9.6 2.5 6.9 
2008 3.1 1.0 3.4 14.8 2.3 3.2 4.2 4.8 3.0 6.0 10.5 2.2 4.5 3.8 3.9 5.7 15.5 3.8 5.3 1.9 3.8 
2009 4.2 2.9 4.1 13.4 2.3 3.3 6.7 3.6 2.8 5.5 12.6 2.7 4.1 9.5 5.9 5.3 13.2 5.6 6.0 3.3 5.1 
Average 4.3 1.4 8.7 19.1 6.6 12.6 10.7 10.8 3.2 13.6 13.9 6.5 14.1 4.9 2.7 10.6 19.7 9.1 9.7 2.5 7.0 
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4.3 Liquidity                   
4.3.1 Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding (%)              
2000 60.0 31.9 17.0 25.2 17.6 32.5 50.8 26.7 20.4 16.5 21.8 27.7 20.6 39.7 7.2 20.0 23.9 29.1 27.1 36.8 39.2 
2004 60.7 27.7 29.5 34.2 11.7 33.8 53.2 30.2 50.2 27.7 19.7 26.3 19.2 42.3 12.4 10.2 20.6 42.8 30.7 33.6 36.9 
2008 48.1 45.7 31.1 47.0 11.5 27.8 32.2 28.0 .. 31.7 16.4 25.1 24.7 44.2 18.3 19.6 25.7 19.9 29.2 30.0 31.5 
2009 52.7 43.7 36.0 41.7 11.2 30.0 34.1 27.8 .. 36.2 16.2 22.6 25.1 52.6 17.0 18.3 26.6 17.3 29.9 29.7 31.7 
Average 57.8 30.0 29.3 36.0 12.9 33.1 47.8 28.6 51.2 26.6 19.5 26.6 22.4 42.6 15.6 17.4 23.2 37.3 30.6 34.4 35.0 
4.4 Sensitivity to market risk and default probability                 
4.4.1 Bank Z-score                    
2000 18.4 28.9 17.3 22.0 21.3 3.4 26.4 20.4 13.1 41.0 4.7 14.6 24.5 9.4 17.9 1.8 33.5 9.8 18.2 20 14.7 
2004 21.3 29.0 19.9 22.2 24.3 16.8 32.6 19.0 14.8 29.8 7.8 15.7 62.0 17.6 21.3 3.7 27.9 13.6 22.2 19.7 15.4 
2008 16.5 7.1 23.3 22.4 28.1 17.6 49.5 18.5 9.8 31.1 10.6 13.0 34.2 19.1 25.5 4.3 29.1 28.6 21.6 19.5 17.6 
2009 19.9 10.7 23.0 22.9 27.5 18.2 48.7 19.3 11.3 33.4 11 15.2 36.8 15.9 27 4.5 29.5 34 22.7 21 18.1 
Average 20.3 25.1 21.2 21.1 23.9 14.0 38.7 19.1 12.1 31.8 8.6 14.6 39.7 18.3 19.2 3.4 29.8 18.2 21.1 18.8 15.8 
Source: Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009); Financial Access Survey, IMF (2012); Global Financial Development Report, World Bank (2012); and World Development Indicators, World Bank (2012) 
Data are averaged over 2000-2009. 
.. indicates unavailable data. 
Highlighted cells represent the highest and the lowest values. 
 
